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INTRODUCTION
For the first t irne in Irurnan history, the international cornrnurrity IS
creating an integrated global econornic order.! The world econorny is
undergoing a t.ransforrnation s irrii lar to that experienced in the United
States around the turn of the century, when national econorn.ic integration began in earnest.? Just as the effective regulation of the newly
national economy necessitated the refinernerrt of the doctrine of federal isrn.> the rise of the global economy has created a need to identify

* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., Woodrow Wilson
School, Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law. My appreciation goes to
Heather Satterfield, Nina Gruzinov-Milovanovich, and Emmett Gilman, who provided research
assistance. I would also like to thank my colleagues John Culhane, Marty Kotler, and Mary Brigid
McManamon for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Several interesting works chronicling the current transformation have been published in
recent years. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sT
CENTURY CAPITALISM (1990) (asserting that national boundaries have become increasingly irrelevant to multinational enterprise and that U.S. policy should therefore promote American workers,
not "American" corporations); WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TwILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1992)
(arguing that the primary economic commodity in the global economy is information, which,
because of its intangible nature, renders states unable to maintain sovereign control over their
economies); and RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994) (recounting how several large corporations in a
number of industries have become globalized and emphasizing the political, social, and economic
implications of this transformation process). See also KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD:
POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY (1999); ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987).
2. See generally BETTY G. FISHMAN ET AL., THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1962); DOUGLAS F.
DOWD, MODERN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1962); EDWIN ROBERT
ANDERSON SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (rev. 2d ed. 1961). Cf
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS (U.S.) ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES COMMISSION., THE
AMERICAN INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, ITS NATURE, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE (1946);
SUMNER H. SLICHTER, MODERN ECONOMIC SOCIETY (1931).
3. American federalism theories have developed to allow the political power of the federal
government, relative to that of the states, to expand dramatically in this century. See generally
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and clarify a rnodcl that coherently delineates the international allocation of sovereign authority.
In this Article, I seek to develop a model that describes the role of
international law in governing a state's assertion of jurisdiction in civil
cases' involving fore igri? defendants" or plaintiffs. 7 In particular, I
Edwin S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Joseph Lesser, The
Course of Federalism in America-An Historical Overview, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING BALANCE
1, 6-8 (Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989); John Minor Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels
of American Federalism, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063 (1984).
There has been, however, a counter-trend in the area of judicial jurisdiction. See Mary Brigid
McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of ({Our Federalism", 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 698-99,
710-12 (1993).
The issue of federalism relative to personal jurisdiction in the United States is almost exclusively discussed in horizontal terms focusing on the need (or lack of need) to protect the relative
jurisdictional powers of the several states vis-a-vis each other. See generally Allan R. Stein, Styles
of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of PersonalJurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REV. 689 (1987);
Janice Toran, Federalism, PersonalJurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TIlL. L. REV. 758 (1984); Terry Kogan,
A Neo-Federalist Tale ofPersonalJurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257 (1990). The "federalism" concerns
that will be explored in this Article are vertical in nature. I attempt to demonstrate that
international law, rather than the internal law of states, appropriately circumscribes the personal
jurisdiction of states in cases involving foreign litigants. The analogous federalist argument within
the American system would be that federal law (i.e., the Constitution) appropriately governs the
allocation of personal jurisdiction between the states within the United States. This is a wholly
unconrroversial proposition within the United States today.
4. For an analysis of whether international law should be applied by domestic courts to
determine the extent of state jurisdiction in international criminal cases, see Andrew Strauss, A
Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme Court's Abduction Decision in
Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994). The article specifically deals with the question
of whether U.S. courts should accept jurisdiction over criminal suspects abducted from foreign
countries in violation of international law.
5. The term "foreign" in this Article means not a citizen of the state whose courts are hearing
a particular lawsuit. This is different from the way the term is commonly used in personal
jurisdiction cases in the United States, where "foreign" signifies that a defendant is a citizen of
another state within the United States and the term "alien" is used to refer to a defendant who
is a citizen of another country. For a discussion of this distinction, see VED P. NANDA & DAVID
K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS 1-52 (1989).
6. The involvement of at least one foreign litigant in a dispute should be the circumstance
triggering the question of whether international standards should be applied. Such involvement
is the best indicator of the existence of issues that are the appropriate concern of the international
order. I realize that such involvement does not cover all situations arguably affecting international
interests. For example, the assertion of jurisdiction by a country over its own national while she
was domiciled in a foreign country could be said to affect the interests of the foreign country. In
contrast, it could be argued that reliance on the nationality of litigants could cause consideration
of the applicability of international law in some situations in which international interests might
arguably not be affected. For example, whether a state asserts jurisdiction over a foreign national
domiciled in its own country is arguably not to be a matter of international concern. In light of
the tremendous importance still given to national identifications today, however, foreign nationality seems to be the best indicator that jurisdictional interests might exist beyond those of the
state asserting jurisdiction and those of its citizens. In addition, when there is arguably a lack of
international interest, as in the second example, determining that the international order should
prescribe jurisdictional rules is not tantamount to saying that international law should deny the
state the right to exercise jurisdiction. Presumably, international law would allow a state to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign national domiciled in its territory.
7. It might be unusual in the United States to think of the nationality of the plaintiff as
relevant to the question of which jurisdictional law should be applied since U.S. contacts analysis
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exam.ine and challenge the current assum.ption that the dom.estic law
of jurisdiction should be applied by dom.estic courts when asserting
personal jurisdiction in cases involving foreign Iitiganrs." International
law's application requires a well-developed, readily applicable body of
legal rules. Correspondingly, I also suggest the need to give clarity and
definition to the currently am.orphous body of international jurisdictional law.?
tends to emphasize the interests of the defendant. See discussion infra part I.A. Plaintiffs obviously
have an interest in ensuring that some forum is available to hear their disputes, (see infra notes
143 and 152 and accompanying text), and often have a strong interest in one forum over another
(see infra note 144 and accompanying text).
8. The model I develop in this Article has substantial implications for the status in domestic
courts of the international law that limits the jurisdiction of states to prescribe laws, as well as
the status in domestic courts of internationally recognized conflict of law principles. I leave for
another day the task of exploring these implications.
9. As I will explain, see discussion infra parts I.A-.C, since countries in the modern contacts
era apply their own jurisdictional laws and seldom feel constrained by international jurisdictional
law, some commentators have concluded that the customary international law of jurisdiction is
now devoid of content. See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, The Execution of Foreign Judgments: A Study in
the International Assimilation of Private Law, 21 ILL. L. REV. 1,9 (1926) C'T'here is no international
rule as to the jurisdiction of courts. Each system has developed, and naturally clings to, those
rules for the jurisdiction of its own courts which are considered to be in the interest of the
population normally dealt with by them . . . ."). See also Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in
International Law, 46 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 145, 1 70 (1972-73).
While the content of international jurisdictional law is perhaps unclear, most authorities agree
that this category of international law exists. As the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] explains:
The exercise of jurisdiction by courts of one state that affects interests of other states is now
generally considered as coming within the domain of customary international law and
international agreement. States have long maintained the right to refuse to give effect to
judgments of other states that are based on assertions of jurisdiction that are considered
extravagant; increasingly, they object to the improper exercise of jurisdiction as itself a
violation of international principles.
lei. at 34. See also 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw §§ 136-137, at 456
(9th ed. 1992) ("[I]nternational law . . . determines the permissible limits of a state's jurisdiction

.... ").
Those who have attempted to derive the content of this law from international custom have
found an existing body of law in what is sometimes called "jurisdiction in the international sense."
This is the law that some states look to instead of their own jurisdictional or foreign law when
deciding whether a foreign court has properly asserted jurisdiction in a case. If they determine
that it has, they will satisfy the foreign court's judgment. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The
Recognition of M oneyJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMPo L. 1, 15-16 (1988)
("Recognizing the problems of measuring jurisdiction, for recognition purposes, by recourse to
domestic or rendition state rules, the English courts have long taken the position that the efficacy
of a foreign judgment ought not to depend on the internal law of either. Instead, they seek to
ascertain whether the foreign court had 'jurisdiction in the international sense' . . . . ").
Commentators attempting to derive the content of the international law of jurisdiction also
look to various treaties on satisfaction of judgments that place acceptable limits on jurisdiction
(see infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text), domestic jurisdictional rules (see discussion infra
parts I.A-.C), and state protests of assertions of jurisdiction by other states. Scholars who have
canvassed explicit state protests or claims of exorbitant jurisdiction include Kurt H. Nadelmann,
Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in TwENTIETH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL W. YNTEMA 321 (1961); Joseph Halpern, "Exorbitani furisdiction"
and the Brussels Convention: Toward a Theory of Restraint, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 369 (1983);
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Presently the Hague Conference on Private International Law!? is
considering sponsoring the developm.ent of a m.ultilateral convention
that would, for the first tim.e outside of a bilateral l 1 or regional F

Thomas E. Carbonneau, The French Exequatur Proceeding: The Exorbitant Jurisdictional Rules of
Articles 14 and 15 (Code Civil) as Obstacles to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in France, 2
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 307 (1979); Louis I. De Winter, ExcessiveJurisdiction in Private
International Law, 17 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 706 (1968); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European
Economic Community and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044 (1981).
For a discussion of the likely content of the international law of jurisdiction, see infra note 17.
10. The Hague Conference on Private International Law was first convened at the instigation
of the Dutch government in 1893. There are now 38 members of the conference, including most
of the Western industrial nations and countries from almost every geographical region of the
world. Its purpose is to provide a multilateral forum for the development of treaties that prescribe,
in various civil and commercial areas, the laws that should be applied within domestic legal
systems. Some conventions provide rules for choosing between different countries' domestic laws
(choice of law); other conventions themselves establish the applicable substantive law to be
applied. The Hague Conference's conventions are very influential in establishing customary norms
that are even applied by states that do not formally accede to them. See generally Peter Pfund,
The Hague Conference Celebrates Its lOOth Anniversary, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 531 (1993); Willis Reese,
The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Some Observations, 19 INT'L LAW. 881 (1985).
Pursuant to congressional authority, the United States became a participatory member in 1965.
S. Exec. Doc. A, at V; Pub. L. No. 88-244, 77 Stat. 775 (1963).
11. The United States has not entered into any bilateral treaties that comprehensively allocate
the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction in international civil cases, but it has entered into
a number of "friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties" that have jurisdictional implications.
These treaties contain clauses requiring each country guarantee court access to nationals of the
other country. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, 4 U.S.T. 2063 (entered into force Oct. 30, 1953). See also Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum
Non Conveniens And Equal Access Under Friendship, Commerce, And Navigation Treaties: A Foreign
Plaintiff's Rights, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 267,282 (1990) (documenting the many
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties that the United States has signed guaranteeing
access to courts). The United States is also party to a number of bilateral investment treaties that,
though limited to the protection of foreign investors, contain similar provisions. See, e.g., The
United States Department of State, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. II, 6, (revised Feb.
24, 1984), in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 655 (S. Zamora & R.
Brand eds. 1990). ("Each party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing
rights with respect to investment agreements, investment aurhorizarions and properties. ").
The United States has also entered into jurisdictional treaties that allocate personal jurisdiction
between the United States and foreign countries over U.S. rrri l irary personnel and their farni Iies
stationed overseas and that affect its troop cleployrnents throughout the NATO countries in
Europe. For example, Law No. 46 of the Office of the United States High Cornrnissioner for
Germany, enacted on April 28, 1955, provides the United States and its courts original jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases pursuant to legislation in effect in the U.S. sector of Berlin.
For a reprint of this agreement, see United States V. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227,237 (1979). See also
Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials Overseas: The Need for an Article III Court, 28 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 8, n.20 (1986).
12. The United States is not a party to any rnulrilateral conventions that have as their general
purpose the definition of international jurisdictional standards, but it is a party to sorne specific
subject area treaties that have jurisdictional provisions. See, e.g., Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 28, 137 L.N.T.S.
13 (entered into force Feb. 13, 1933) (more commonly known as the Warsaw Convention, this
treaty provides that liability actions against airlines under the terms of the Convention are
restricted to the following fora: (1) the carrier's domicile; (2) the carrier's principal place of
business; (3) the place where the ticket was purchased; or (4) the passenger's place of destination).
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fram.ework, precisely define an international law of jurisdicrion.V This
Article is also a call for the negotiation and adoption of such a conven-

The most important regional agreements with implications for personal jurisdiction have been
those to secure the recognition and satisfaction of foreign judgments among European countries.
See the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), as amended by the Accession Convention
of Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom of 9 October 1978, O. J. L
304/77, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 20 (1979) [hereinafter Brussels Convention] (entered into force
between the original six Member States and Denmark on Nov. 1, 1986, between these countries
and the United Kingdom on Nov. 1, 1987, and between these countries and Ireland on June 1,
1988). The Convention has since been amended to include new members of the European Union
and to extend substantially similar provisions to the combined market countries of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA). Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portuguese Republic to the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990). See also
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
of 16 Sept. 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano
Convention] (entered into force among ratifying countries Jan. 1, 1992) (The Lugano Convention
extended the principles of the Brussels Convention to relations between the Member States of the
European Union and the EFTA, which include Finland, Norway, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland
and Sweden. All members of the European Union and the EFTA, with the exception of Spain,
are signatories to the Lugano Convention, but only 11 of these countries, France, Finland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom, have ratified that convention). For an excellent review of the major provisions in the
Brussels and Lugano conventions, and of the relationship between the two, see Elizabeth M.
McCaffrey, The Lugano and San Sebastion Conventions: General Effects, 11 CIV. JUST. Q. 12 (1992).
The main purpose of the Brussels Convention and related agreements was to provide for the
effective recognition and satisfaction of judgements. States often refused, however, to enforce
foreign judgments rendered without what they considered to be adequate jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Brussels Convention and related agreements established mandatory rules governing the
assertion of personal jurisdiction between signatory states with the goal of providing that
judgments will be routinely satisfied.
See also Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, P.A.U.T.S. 51, 18 I.L.M. 1224 (entered into force June 14, 1980)
(establishing conditions under which judgments and arbitral awards rendered in civil, commercial,
or labor proceedings shall be given validity in the territory of other parties); Inter-American
Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments, May 24,1984 (not in force) (setting out the circumstances where courts and tribunals
are to be regarded as "competent in the international sphere" (within the meaning of Art. 2(d)
of the Montevideo Convention) to deal with particular legal issues, and establishing certain
circumstances where foreign judgments shall not have extraterritorial validity).
13. A Special Commission of the Hague Conference has recently recommended that the
Conference should undertake to sponsor the conclusion of such a treaty. If the Conference follows
the recommendation of the Commission, negotiations over this treaty would commence in
October 1996.
In 1925 the Hague Conference drafted a model bilateral agreement on satisfaction of judgments
that left specific jurisdictional provisions up to future agreements between treaty parties. There
is already an existing Hague Convention on rhe recognition and enforcement of judgments. See
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters and Supplemental Protocol, Feb. 1, 1971 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1979). To date,
however, only three countries, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Portugal, have acceded to this
Convention. T'he United States signed the Convention but never ratified it. The Convention left
the difficult issue of establishing international jurisdictional rules to bilateral supplemental
agreements that under the terms of the Convention had to be concluded between individual
signatories before the Convention could enter into force between them. The Convention is
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t.iorr !" In cases where litigants are frorn states that do not accede to
the convention, or in the event that the convention is not adopted, the
Article additionally suggests that courts begin to apply the cusrornary
international law of jurisclicrion"? with the hope that they engage in
an international judicial d ialogue!? that will have the practical effect
of developing and refining this Iaw.l?
In this Article, Illy rncthodological approach is to focus priIllarily
on the laws and jurisdictional doctrine of the United States. Where
relevant, I em.ploy foreign doctrine to indicate the broader scope of m.y
conclusions. My claim is that the international law of personal juris-

generally considered a failure. At the time it was being negotiated, the European Union countries
decided to proceed with the Brussels Convention, see supra note 12, which effectively diverted all
attention away from the Hague Convention.
14. This Article is limited to making a case for an international law of jurisdiction. It therefore
does not appraise the relative merits of any of the alternative proposals that are being discussed
for inclusion in a possible Hague Convention.
15. See supra note 9 (discussing the existence of this law); see also infra note 1 7 (discussing the
likely content of this law).
Customary international law usually is defined as the general practices of states that are accepted
as law. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, § 10. Along with treaties, such as the proposed Hague
Convention, custom is today generally regarded as one of the two major positivist sources of
international law. For a discussion of natural law as a source of international law, see infra notes
123-124.
16. This term generally is used to refer to the dialogue that takes place between members of
the same court when they speak to each other through multiple opinions. I use it to refer to the
discussion that could take place between members of different courts and even different judiciaries. For a discussion of the ways that judicial dialogue develops and refines legal principles, see
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4,33-36 (1986).
1 7. Although the content of .rhe international law of jurisdiction is somewhat unclear, and
significant disagreements between states as to the acceptable basis for exercising adjudicative
jurisdiction continue (see infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text), consensus exists around
certain broad parameters. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, pt. IV, § 421, reporters' note
1. ("The modern concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law are similar to those
developed under the due process clause of the United States Constitution . . . . The standards
here set forth are comparable also to the criteria set out in Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom (1983) and to the standards applicable among EEC domiciliaries
set forth in the 1968 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended in 1978."); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 298, 306-07 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing the requirement of a
sufficiently close connection between the subject matter and the state to justify a state's assertion
of jurisdiction); LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
224-49 (1989) (taking a policy-oriented perspective to examine the allocation of international
adjudicatory jurisdiction and explaining the principles of jurisdictional judicial authority); F.A.
Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 R.C.A.D.I. 9
(1984); Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated,
63 B.U. L. REV. 279 (1983). Significant areas of disagreement nonetheless remain. See Henry
DeVries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld,Jurisdiction in Personal Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views,
44 IOWA L. REV. 306, 344 (1959) ("A uniform concept of personal jurisdiction of civil-law courts
in international relations cannot be presumed . . . . W"hether 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice' can be reconciled in the international area of law will emerge as a vital problem
in the growth of an increasingly unified Atlantic Community."). For a discussion of specific
differences in concepts of jurisdiction, see infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
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diction should be applied by dom.estic courts not only in the United
States, but in all countries.
I use the two dom.inant m.odes of analytical inquiry, positivism. and
norm.ativism., to arrive at m.y conclusion that the international law of
jurisdiction should be applied in dom.estic courts. The positivist rationale, as described in Part II.A, provides essentially that if legal
doctrine is to reinforce rather than weaken the existing international
systern, it m.ust be consistent with the paradigm. upon which that
system. is based. The relevant sovereignty paradigm., as I call it, provides that dom.estic law regulates private actors who are within the
jurisdictional realm.s of the various states and that international law
regulates relations between states. The m.ajority of this Article is
com.m.itted to resolving the unique conceptual problem.s that arise
when applying the paradigm. to determ.ine whether state courts should
apply a dom.estic or international law of jurisdiction in cases involving
foreign litigants.
I begin in Part II.B.l with an historical review of the application
of the sovereignty paradigm. to personal jurisdiction. What I call the
"era of territorial jurisdiction" was defined by a belief that the state's
jurisdictional powers were static and that such powers gave each state
exclusive dom.ain within the realm. of its own territory. Protecting 'the
territorial integrity of states from. encroachm.ents by other states was
the m.anifest jurisdictional concern in the territorial era. Because this
concern involved the governance of relations between sovereigns, jurisdiction was at that tim.e easily understood to fit com.fortably within
the realm. of international law. Part II.B.2 explains that the new
contacts era em.phasis on the consent of the defendant was an attem.pt
to establish a basis for state assertions of personal jurisdiction that was
independent of the state's own lim.ited territorial powers. This em.phasis, however, led doctrine-m.akers to believe that jurisdiction was concerned with the state's regulation of private actors and was, therefore,
under the paradigm., properly the subject of dom.estic rather than
international law. In Part II.B.3, I explain that state jurisdictional
powers are not static, and that the shift to contacts jurisdiction represented a dynam.ic alteration in the power of states to assert jurisdiction
that was independent of the defendant's consent. Understood now as a
question of how independent state powers are defined, I dem.onstrate
that because this definition necessarily affects the division of jurisdictional responsibility of all states, the paradigm. requires prescription
by the international order.
Having established that the international order should properly
circurnscrrbe state assertions of jurisdiction, Part II.C asks whether
what is called the doctrine of dualism. m.ight nevertheless prevent the
application of international jurisdictional law in dom.estic courts. Un-
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der the dualist interpretation of the sovereignty paradigm., states are
thought to have the power to direct their courts not to apply international law. I dem.onstrate, however, that the unique nature of jurisdiction precludes dom.estic courts from. invoking the dualism. concept as
a m.eans to avoid applying the international law of jurisdiction.
Finally, Part III of the Article m.akes the norm.ative case for the
dom.estic application of international jurisdiction law. Specifically, I
explain that the creation of a coherent international jurisdictional
system. dem.ands that the international law of jurisdiction be fully
developed and dom.estically applied.
To put m.y thesis in context, I will first describe in Part I the various
dom.estic doctrines related to jurisdiction and dem.onstrate that these
dom.estic doctrines are applied in national courts regardless of the
citizenship of the parties to a dispute. I define "doctrine related to
jurisdiction" as the body of doctrine that determ.ines which forum.
ultim.ately hears a dispute. This contrasts with the understanding in
the United States of jurisdiction as lim.ited to constraints that em.anate
from. the United States Constitution. A discussion of doctrine related
to jurisdiction is an im.portant starting point for the Article because
it specifies the entire body of law that should be supplanted by an
international law of jurisdiction in cases involving foreign parties.
I. DOMESTIC DOCTRINE RELATED TO JURISDICTION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD, AND THE
ASSUMPTION OF UNIVERSAL APPLICATION

A. The Contemporary American System of Personal Jurisdiction: Minimum
Contacts and Related Doctrines
Every first-year law student in the United States learns in civil
procedure class that the ability of a federal or state forum. to assert
personal jurisdiction over a civil defendant is determ.ined by the United
States Constitution. The forum. m.ay not exercise jurisdiction if doing
so would violate the defendant's rights under the Constitution's applicable Due Process Clause.!"
The nature of these rights in the m.odern or "contacts" era was
originally laid out in the 1945 case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'? In that case the Suprem.e Court explicitly endorsed what cam.e
to be identified as the m.inim.um. contacts test:
18. When the jurisdiction of state courts is in question, the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment applies. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I. When the jurisdiction of the federal courts
is in question, see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendm.ent is applicable. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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[D}ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgm.ent in personam, if he be not present wir.hrn the territory
of the forum., he have certain m.inim.um. contacts with it such that
the m.aintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."20
Precisely defining the nature of the contacts 21 necessary for a court in
the United States to assert jurisdiction properly, however, has been the
continual subject of litigation, with m.any cases decided by the Suprem.e Court itself. 22 Moreover, perhaps no other area of law in the
United States has been the subject of m.ore academ.ic comrnenrary.e>
What constitutes sufficient contacts varies depending upon the underlying factual situation. Often, the contacts necessary for jurisdiction
arise out of the conduct or activity that gave rise to the litigation itself,
thus creating "specific jurisdiction."24 Under this doctrine, for exam.ple,
a court in a breach of contract action can assert jurisdiction over a
20. lei. at 316.
21. The rni nirnurn contacts test is only the rnost conunon application in the United States of
what I call contacts analysis. "Contacts analysis" here refers to the jurisdiction-establishing
rnerhod that emphasizes the contacts between the sovereign or the geographic area where the
court sits and the defendant or dispute, rather than emphasizing the protection of the state's
territorial sovereignty, see infra text accompanying note 76. Contacts analysis in this sense is
applied in nurnerous countries. See infra note 103 and notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
Dornicile, nationality or citizenship, and service while present in the forurn-c-cal l ways of
establishing jurisdiction in the United States-are sornetirnes considered doctrinally distinct from
the ITliniITlUITl contacts test. See Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (holding that an individual
is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where he or she is dornici led); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding that nationality or citizenship provides a basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that
service of process while present within the forum is a sufficient basis for establishing jurisdiction).
I include these in my definition of contacts analysis, however, because the rationale used to support
rhern today emphasizes contacts rather than the protection of territorial sovereignty.
As will be discussed in part II.B.3, contacts could be with a territorially defined sovereign, a
nationally defined sovereign, or sirnpl y with the area where a particular court sits.
22. Since International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court of the United States has
revisited the issue of personal jurisdiction on 13 occasions. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Kulka v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978); W"orld-W"ide Volkswagen Corp. v. W"oodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Ins. Corp. of
Ireland v. Cornpagriie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colorrrbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burriharn
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
23. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES A. W"RIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1064-1081 (1987) (citing numerous scholarly legal sources in the area and canvassing
relevant case law); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY K. KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 95-190 (1985) (explaining personal jurisdiction and citing authoritative support and
cornrnenrary),
24. For further explanation, see Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 610, 661-62 (1988).
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party-regardless of the party's residence-based on the contract's
having been negotiated, signed, or perform.ed in the forum. state. In
contrast, "general jurisdiction" exists when the defendant's overall
contacts with the forum state are so significant that the court can assert
jurisdiction over her regardless of the connections between the underlying controversy and the state. For example, a court can assert general
jurisdiction over all people domiciled within it. 2 5 In a minority of
cases, the jurisdictional question focuses on whether a forum. can
exercise jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the dispute,
rather than over an individual. The general rule is that a forum. m.ay
assert jurisdiction over a dispute involving property that is located
within the forurn.P?
Under the multifaceted schem.e that has developed in the United
States, if the constitutional threshold of rninirnurn contacts is m.et,
other doctrines can be em.ployed to help direct civil cases to the
appropriate forurn.F? Most im.portantly, state and federal forums in the
United States have discretion to establish rules and procedures that
allow them to decline to exercise their constitutional grant of jurisdiction. 2 8 All states utilize "long arm." statutes, which limit the cases that
their courts may hear. In fact, m.ost states do not allow their courts to
exercise jurisdiction to the fullexrenr permitted by the Constit.ut ion.P?
Federal district courts use the long arm statutes of the states in which
they sit in all diversity cases and in federal question cases where there
are no applicable federal long arm provisions. 30 In addition, individual

25. The distinction between specific and general jurisdiction was first suggested by Arthur
von Mehren and Donald Trautman. Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-63 (1966). The Supreme Court
adopted it in Heiicopteros , 466 U.s. 408. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
26. For further explanation, see ROBERT C. CASAD, 2 JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTION § 3.05
(1991).
27. These are the doctrines that are not considered determinative of jurisdiction in the United
States because unlike the minimum contacts analysis, they are not mandated by the Constitution.
As I indicated in the Introduction, however, like the constitutional test, these doctrines are
important to this Article because they would yield to international law to the extent that it
provides an integrated jurisdictional scheme.
28. See generally JOSEPH ~ GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 23-24 (2d ed. 1992).
29. Some state legislatures have, however, authorized their courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed under the Due Process Clause. See generally ide at 24.
30. When the personal jurisdiction of a federal court is at issue, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is understood to direct that court to apply the long arm provision of the federal
legislation being substantively applied, assuming such a provision exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. Such
provisions have generally been interpreted to provide that contacts with the United States as a
whole (national contacts) rather than with any particular U.S. state, is sufficient to establish the
personal jurisdiction of the federal forum. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1994); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994) (providing
for national contacts as a basis of jurisdiction). If no such provision exists, or in a diversity case
where state law is being applied, Rule 4 directs the federal court to apply the long arm statute
of the state in which the court sits. The rule was recently amended, however, to provide that in
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states and the federal governm.ent have rules of venue that direct cases
to those courts within the forum. that are geographically m.ost convenient. Finally, the federal system"! and m.any state sysrems-? have adopted
the Scottish com.m.on law doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine
gives judges the discretion to dism.iss a case or transfer it to another
court within the forum. when it would be significantly more convenient
for it to be heard elsewhere.V'

B. The Application of United States Doctrine Related to Jurisdiction to
Cases Involving Foreign Litigants
Civil procedure students in the United States are taught that dom.estic jurisdiction doctrines apply universally, to cases involving a
foreign party as well as those involving only dom.estic litigants. When
one of the parties is foreign, United States courts have assum.ed it
appropriate to overlook international jurisdiction law and apply solely
United States constitutional, statutory, and com.m.on law doctrines
related to jurisdiction.
The four United States Suprem.e Court cases that have dealt with
personal jurisdiction over foreign civil defendants in the rni nirnurn
contacts era exem.plify this failure to consider whether international
law should be applied. The first of the four cases is Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, decided in 1952. 34 In that case, the
plaintiff filed suit in Ohio against a Philippine corporation. The Court
found that although the underlying cause of action did not arise in
Ohio, an assertion of jurisdiction was valid under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. The decision was based on
the fact that during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the
corporation had conducted "continuous and system.atic"35 business acfederal question cases, where there is no applicable long arm statute, if the foreign defendant does
not have contacts with any individual state sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under the
state's own long arm statute, but does have the requisite national contacts under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, any federal court can assert personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(k)(2).
31. The federal system has adopted the doctrine of forum non conveniens by statute. See 28 u.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1988). See also 28 u.S..C . § 1441 (1988) (setting forth grounds for removal of cases
from state court to federal court).
32. Some states recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens by statute, some recognize it by
common law, and some do not recognize the doctrine at all. See generally 15 CHARLES A. W"RIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3846 (1986).
33. "Convenience" factors include the private interests of the litigants, ease of access to sources
of proof, ease and expense of compelling reluctant witnesses to attend proceedings, expense of
transporting willing witnesses, and the enforceability of judgment once it is obtained. This list
is not exhaustive, and every situation presents different legal obstacles. See Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 u.S. 501, 507-09 (1947). See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 u.S. 235 (1981).
34. 342 u.S. 437 (1952).
35. During the war, the president of the corporation conducted some business activities on
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tivities in Ohio. 36 As the first Suprem.e Court personal jurisdiction case
involving a foreign defendant, Perkins provided the Court the opportunity to address the fundam.ental question of whether United States
or international jurisdiction law should be applied. Instead of confronting this issue, the Court sim.ply assum.ed that the relevant jurisdictional law em.anated from. the United States.V
The Court was not faced with another personal jurisdiction case
involving foreign parties until 1982, when it decided Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee. 3 8 In that
case, Com.pagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee ("Bauxites"), filed suit in
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
against a num.ber of insurance cornpanies.v? Bauxites alleged that the
com.panies had refused to indem.nify it for losses that were covered
under its policies. Half of the claim.ed coverage was provided by a
United States insurance com.pany, and the other half was provided by
a group of twenty-one foreign insurance com.panies. Fourteen of these
com.panies challenged the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
United States forum.. These fourteen defendants refused to com.ply with
the court's repeated. orders for production of docum.ents containing
inform.ation relevant to a dererrnination of whether they had m.inim.um.
contacts with the forum.. The court ultim.ately sanctioned them. by
ruling that m.inim.um. contacts had been established and that the
defendants were foreclosed from. disputing jur.isdiction.r'" In upholding
the U.S. District Court's assertion of jurisdiction, the Suprem.e Court
looked only to the United States Constitution and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.v' Even though foreign defendants were involved,
behalf of the corporation from Ohio. For example, he had an office, employed several secretaries,
drew salary checks on behalf of the corporation, and held several directors meetings in that state.
Id. at 447-48.
36. This is an example of general jurisdiction. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. "The answer to the question whether the state courts of Ohio are open to a proceeding in
personam against an amply notified foreign corporation to enforce a cause of action not arising in
Ohio and not related to the business or activities of the corporation in that State, rests entirely
upon the law of Ohio, unless the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels a decision
either way." Perkins, 342 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
38. 456 U.S. 694 (1981).
39. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 554 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D. Pa.
1983).
40. The sanction was arguably permitted by FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A), which provides: "[If
a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, the court may make an] order that
the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to
be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order . . . ." Id.
41. The Court first looks to the Constitution to find the applicable source of law. Ins. Corp. of
Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 ("The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from
Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause."). It then uses the Constitution to conclude that, "[a]s
a general proposition, the Rule 37 sanction applied to a finding of personal jurisdiction creates
no more of a due process problem than the Rule 12 waiver." Id. at 705.
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the Court never considered the possibility that international law should
play a role in this determination.
Two years later, the Supreme Court handed down its next case
involving a foreign defendant, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall. 4 2 This case addressed whether a Texas court could assert
jurisdiction over a Colombian corporate defendant in a wrongful death
action. The defendant's helicopter crashed in Peru, killing four Americans. The sales contract for the helicopter that crashed was negotiated
by the defendant in Texas, and the defendant had purchased other
helicopters in Texas. The defendant's pilots and m.anagem.ent were
trained in Texas, and the checks paying for the defendant's transportation services were drawn on a Texas bank and paid into a New York
account. While this case was important to the development of the
domestic law of personal jurisdiction.Y the Court again assumed that
the scope of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is delineated solely
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am.endm.ent. 44
Finally, in the 1987 Supreme Court case of Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court,45 neither the plaintiff46 nor the defendant corporations
were United States citizens. In this case, the original plaintiff was
42. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
43. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether purchases made on a regular basis, but
unrelated to the cause of action, are sufficient to subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction. Unequivocally distinguishing specific jurisdiction from general personal jurisdiction for the
first time, the Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over Helicopteros would be of a general
nature. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, nn.8-9. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Characterizing money transfer as of "negligible significance," and minimizing the importance of the
chief executive officer's travel to Texas to negotiate the contract, the Court concluded that the
purchases, although regular, did not constitute "continuous and systematic" activity, and thus
were not sufficient for the exercise of general in personam jurisdiction. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
416-18 (relying upon its decision in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516
(1923».
44. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to limit the power of a
State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." Helicopteros , 466 U.S. at
413-14 (emphasis added).
45. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
46. This is the only Supreme Court personal jurisdiction case in the contacts era in which the
plaintiff was not an American citizen. In lower court cases involving foreign plaintiffs, the courts
always assume that U.S. jurisdiction law applies. It would be very surprising if this was not the
case given that international law is not applied to cases involving foreign defendants despite the
prevailing belief in the United States that the law of jurisdiction is about protecting the rights
of defendants. For a discussion of the jurisdictional interests of plaintiffs, see supra note 7 and
infra notes 143, 144, and 152 and accompanying text.
In Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), the
plaintiff-respondent, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, was a U.S. corporation incorporated in
Delaware. It was 49% owned by the Republic of Guinea, however, and its principal place of
business was in the Republic of Guinea. This raises important questions about what it means to
call a corporate plaintiff a "U.S. corporation." This Article assumes, in accordance with the
accepted international rule, that the only factor relevant to a corporation's citizenship is its place
of incorporation. See, e.g.; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.].
3 (Feb. 5). This is becoming an increasingly meaningless way to identify a corporation's actual
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injured when he lost control of his motorcycle due to a faulty motorcycle valve. He sued the m.anufacturer of the motorcycle tire, Cheng
Shin (a Taiwanese m.anufacturer) in California court. Cheng Shin, in
turn, filed a cross-com.plaint seeking indem.nification from. Asahi, the
Japanese supplier of the tire tube's valve. The original plaintiff ultim.ately settled with Cheng Shin, leaving only the action for indem.nification between the two foreign parties to be decided by the California court. Asahi challenged the jurisdiction of the California court.
Despite the obvious questions raised by the facts of this case about
the role of United States law in prescribing the rules of jurisdiction in
international cases, the Court again failed to inquire into whether
international law should be applied. In a plurality opinion, the Court
per Justice O'Connor acknowledged for the first tim.e that unique
factors are involved in asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign
deferidant ,"? For O'Connor, however, such factors were irnporranr only
for the purpose of applying the sam.e constitutional rniriirriurn contacts
test that is routinely applied to dom.estic defendanrs.r'" In fact, Justice
O'Connor never discussed the relevance of international law to the case.
All four of these cases (except Insurance Corporation of Ireland) dealt
with the validity of assertions of jurisdiction by state courts in the
United States. It is perhaps more likely that the international law of
Jurisdiction would be applied to assertions of jurisdiction m.ade by
federal courts. After all, in United States federalism., the national
sovereign is not just one of the "several states", am.ong whom. judicial
authority constitutionally m.ust be allocated. Rather, the federal sovereign has its own international legal personality as the direct representative of the United States to the international com.m.unity. As such,
the federal sovereign is one of the international sovereigns am.ong
whom. judicial authority arguably should be internationally allocated.
This, however, is not the case. All four of these cases used the sam.e
touchstone: the Court in each assum.ed that the United States Consti-

connections to a particular forum. For a discussion of "The Coming Irrelevance of Corporate
Nationality," see generally REICH, supra note 1 at Chapter 12.
47. Justice O'Connor specified that the defendant is forced to litigate in a foreign legal system.,
and that there are potential implications for u.s. foreign policy. Asahi, 480 u.s. at 115.
In a case involving the establishment of jurisdiction to freeze a foreign bank account, Justice
Harlan had previously, in a dissent, admonished that, "great care and reserve should be exercised
when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field." United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 u.S. 378,404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. "This case presents the question whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign
defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States
would reach the forum state in the stream. of commerce constitutes 'minimum contacts' between
the defendant and the forum state . . . ." Asahi 480 U.S. at 105.
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tution4 9-and not international law-provides the ultim.ate restraint
on jurisdiction.?"
Sim.ilarly, courts aSSUITle that the dornestic doctrines related to jurisdiction that allow for'urns to decline to exercise their constitutional
grant of jurisdiction are applicable to all cases regardless of the nationality of the Iitiganrs.>'
Like the courts, legal cornrnenrators have failed to question whether
the international law of jurisdiction should be applied. The articles
that discuss cases involving foreign parties assum.e that the relevant
jurisdictional doctrines to be applied by both state and federal courts
are the clornest.ic ones.V

49. Regardless of whether a long arm provision is found in federal legislation, a state long
arm statute is being applied, or the national contacts standard of Rule 4 is applied, it is always
assumed that the U.S. Constitution and not international law provides the ultimate restraint on
jurisdiction. For a discussion of domestic long arm provisions applicable to federal courts, see
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
50. Following is a representative sampling of circuit court cases that assume that domestic,
rather than international law, is applicable. E.g., Insurance Corporation of Ireland, 651 F.2d 877, see
supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's review of the case); In
re Chase & Sanborn Corp. 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the bankruptcy court's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Colombian defendants satisfied due process and statutory
requirements); W"ells Fargo & Co. v. W"ells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 (9th Cir. 1977)
(pointing out that "not only must the requirements of due process be met before a court can
properly assert in personam jurisdiction, but the exercise of jurisdiction must also be affirmatively
authorized by the legislature"); Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir.
1975) (stressing that "having decided that the Florida statute authorized the assertion of jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case, we turn to the second aspect of our inquiry: is the
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the company constitutionally permissible?"); see also
Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989); Vermeulen v. Renault,
U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545 (11th Cir. 1993); Command-Aire Corp. v. Ontario Mechanical
Sales and Servo Inc., 963 F.2d 90, 93-94 (5th Cir, 1992); Koteen v. Bermuda Cablevision, Ltd.,
913 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1981) (subjecting
foreign defendants to Texas long arm statute); MIS Bremen V. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972) (applying U.S. version of forum non conveniens and U.S. case law on forum selection clauses
to overturn finding of jurisdiction over foreign defendant).
These domestic doctrines, particularly forum non conveniens, are sometimes applied differently to
foreign litigants. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). See also Molly M.
White, Home Field Advantage: The Exploitation of Federal Forum Non Conveniens by United States
Corporations and its Effects on International Environmental Litigation, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 491
(1993); Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access Under Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation Treaties: A Foreign Plaintiff's Rights, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 267
(1990).
52. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence ofJurisdiction, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 913 (1985); R. Lawrence Dessem, PersonalJurisdiction After Asahi: The Other (International)
Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REV. 41 (1987); William VanDercreek,Jurisdiction Over the Person-The
Progeny of Pennoyer and the Future of Asahi, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1287 (1987); Kim Dayton, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LITIG. 239 (1988); David Seidelson, A Supreme Court
Conclusion and Two Rationales that Defy Comprehension: Asahi Metal Indus. Co., LTD. V. Superior
Court of California, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 563 (1987).
Several commentators have argued that in cases involving foreign defendants or federal asser-
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C. The Domestic Law of Adjudicatory Jurisdiction in Civil Law
Countries and its Application to Cases Involving Foreign Litigants
Like the United States, other countries are provincial in their approaches to asserting jurisdiction in cases involving foreign litigants.
For example, law students in France'< learn that article 42 of the
French Code de Procedure Civile provides that defendants rnay ulways
be sued at their place of dornici le.P" Alternative forum.s are provided
by the place where a tort is com.m.itted or where a contract is perforrned.P? In France, . law students learn additionally that articles 14
and 15 of the French Code Civile>" (unlike United States law) include
special substantive provisions for foreign litigants. Far from requiring
the application of international standards, however, these articles perrnir French courts to assert exclusive juriscliction?" wherieverv'' a French
national is either a plaintiff or a defendant in a su it .P?

tions of jurisdiction, the United States generally, rather than a particular state, should be
considered the relevant entity with which a defendant must have rni nirrrum contacts. These
commentators premise this arg umerir on an analysis of the U.S. Constitution rather than on
international law. See, e.g., Graham Lilly,Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L.
REV. 85 (1983); Gary Born, Reflections onJudicialJurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L
& COMPo L. 1 (1987); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Robert Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process:
Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Brian Frasch,
National Contacts as a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction Over Aliens in Federal Questions Suits, 70
CAL. L. REV. 686 (1982).
53. I reference France because it is the horne of the civil law tradition and its basic approach
to jurisdiction has been adopted throughout the civil law world. Despite this, most countries
have not adopted anything similar to articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code. See infra notes
56-59 and accompanying text. The U.S. approach is broadly representative of the other major
legal tradition, the common law tradition, which started in England.
54. CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C. PROC. CIV.] art. 42 (Fr.).
55. C. PROC. CIV. art. 46 (Fr.).
56. Articles 14 and 15 read as follows:
An alien, though not residing in France, can be cited before the French courts, for the
performance of obligations contracted by him in France with a Frenchman; he can be
brought before French courts for obligations contracted by him in a foreign country toward
Frenchmen.
C. CIV. art. 14 (Fr.)
A Frenchman can be brought before a court of France for obligations contracted by him in
a foreign country even with an alien.
C. CIV. art. 15 (Fr.).
57. Articles 14 and 15 were interpreted to establish the exclusive jurisdiction of French courts
by the French Cour de cassation in Judgment of Mar. 17, 1830 (Challier V. Ovel) , Casso req.,
1830 Recueil Sirey [5. Jur. I] 95, at 97 (Fr.).
58. Because the term "obligations" has been construed to apply to both contracts and torts,
these provisions are generally applied. .See Judgment of Dec. 13, 1842 (Comp. du Britannia V.
Compo du Phenix), Casso req., 18'43 [5. Jur. I] 14 (Fr.),
59. The Brussels Convention supercedes and invalidates articles 14 and 15 as to treaty
signatories. See Brussels Convention, supra note 12, art. 3. For a discussion of the discriminatory
implications of this, see infra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
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D. The General Applicability of International Law in Domestic Courts
When international law exists in a certain area-as it does in the
area of personal jurisdiction in cases involving foreign litigants60-nations adhere to various doctrines that hold, with certain qualifications
that will be discussed in Part II.C, that the international law should
be applied. The classic United States srarernerit of this doctrine was
articulated in the turn-of-the-century Suprem.e Court decision of The
Paquete Habana: "International law is part of our law, and m.ust be
ascertained and adm.inistered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determ.ination."61 Pursuant to this doctrine, international law is periodically applied by courts within the United Srares.s?
Why then are civil procedure students in the United States never
taught in accordance with The Paquete Habana to consider that the
international law of jurisdiction is in theory-if not in practice-applicable in the United States, and why are students in France sim.ilarly
never taught to consider the possibility that the international law of
jurisdiction m.ay be applicable in French courts?63 To understand why
this view that international law is not applicable in jurisdictional cases
involving foreign parties prevails, and to see why this belief is inconsistent with the underlying social order upon which the international
system. is based, this Article will now turn to the positivist analysis.
II. THE POSITIVIST ANALYSIS

A. Legal Positivism and the Sovereignty Paradigm
Law is a human invention to help order social behavior. To accom.plish this task, when legal doctrines are not being em.ployed to create
new (or to reform) social institutions, such doctrines rnust reinforce
existing social institutions. The craft of developing these legal doctrines requires that judges, legislators, com.m.entators, and other "doc60. See supra note 9, suggesting that there is an international law of jurisdiction. See supra note
17, suggesting the likely content of that law.
61. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Paquete Habana court applied
customary international law. For early authority upholding the validity of international agreements in U.S. courts, see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190 (1888). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 111(1) ("International law and
international agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreITle over the
law of the several States. "),
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 111, cmt. C, intro. to pt. I, ch. 1 (noting that,
"In appropriate cases [American courts) apply international law or agreements . . . .").
63. See Luzius Wildhaber & Stephan Breitenmoser, The Relationship Between Customary International Law and Municipal Law in Western European Countries, 48 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR {A]USLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT & VOLKERRECHT § 3.1.5, (1988) (supporting the idea that French
tribunals have regarded the rules of customary international law as directly applicable).
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trine-rnakers" derive such doctrines frorn an underlying parad igrn'r'
that describes the relevant social institution. 6 5 Docrr'ine-rnakers fail in
their craft when their legal doctrines do not accurately reflect the
underlying paradigm.. 66 Law then acts to weaken rather than strengthen
the institutional structure and ceases to perform. its fundam.ental m.isAs it is impossible to overlook major treaties, French law students are taught, as are American
law students (see supra note 61), that the jurisdictional provisions of applicable self-executing
treaties such as the Brussels Convention (see supra note 12), apply in their domestic courts. See,
e.g., LA CONSTITUTION art. 55 (Fr.) (providing that properly ratified and approved treaties have
priority over French municipal law). My colleagues in Paris assure me that, while it is assumed
that jurisdictional provisions of treaties apply, the courts never consider applying the customary
international law of jurisdiction.
64. My definition of "paradigm" has been highly influenced by Thomas Kuhn, who used the
word to connote a conceptual framework generally held by the scientific community that describes
or explains natural phenomena. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962). The word has gained currency among social scientists in the last two decades as a means
of describing a generally held conceptual framework that explains human institutions. A paradigm
becomes generally accepted because it appears to explain underlying phenomena. The key to
understanding Kuhn's concept of the paradigm is to realize that a paradigm is not "true" in an
objective or absolute sense. Rather it functions only to explain phenomena for analytically useful
purposes for a certain period of time. Because of a successful paradigm's apparent ability to explain
such phenomena, however, it comes to be generally accepted by the scientific community as
"true." As the paradigm is applied to new and different problems, its explanatory limits become
apparent, and the resultant "anomalies" prompt the emergence of a new paradigm to explain the
phenomena. According to Kuhn, while the scientific community is skeptical at first, it slowly
accepts the "superior" explanatory power of the new paradigm and a "scientific revolution" is
accomplished. Id.
The paradigm concept does not perfectly apply when used to connote a generally accepted
framework for explaining our own social institutions, rather than phenomena relatively independent of them. Such institutions-unlike the phenomena of the "natural world"-are themselves directly influenced by the acceptance of the paradigm. These institutions are also highly
unstable relative to the natural world, so paradigms may have to be abandoned due to fundamental alterations in the underlying institutions they are meant to explain. See infra note 66.
65. Because doctrine-makers do not see themselves as formally engaging in this process does
not mean that it is not occurring. Judges implicitly derive doctrines from paradigms describing
social institutions, for example, when they attempt to "find" the common law. If they are
attempting to determine whether to allow divorces or homosexual marriages, and they do not
look to change existing family structure, they will identify the paradigm that models the
institutions of the family and derive the appropriate doctrine from that paradigm. Doctrine-makers engage in this process when they ask themselves, ""What does it mean to call something a
family, and is divorce or homosexual marriage consistent with it?"
66. This account of the process, for simplicity's sake, synthetically isolates the creation of the
underlying paradigm from the process of doctrine-making. It artificially assumes that doctrinemakers do not have a role in the creation of the paradigm itself. Such a role is particularly obvious
during times of rapid social change. To the extent that changing economic, social, or political
circumstances force changes in an underlying institutional structure, the existing paradigm will
no longer accurately reflect that new structure. Doctrine-makers who find themselves in the
position of having to respond to new problems not adequately accounted for in the old paradigm
will necessarily be participants in the development of a new paradigm. Robert Lipkin has written
on the direct role of a judge-one kind of doctrine-maker-in the creation of new constitutional
paradigms. He describes when doctrine-makers must involve themselves in this task:
Generally, a revolutionary constitutional decision is a response to a perceived constitutional
or social crisis . . . . A crisis may occur when there is an intractable problem in constitutional law itself, for example, when there is no paradigm in an area involving much social
and political upheaval[, or . . . } when the current paradigm is indeterminate [cite omitted}
or radically defective . . . .
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sion of helping to order social behavior. In the following section of this
Article, I specifically assess the com.m.only held belief that the "domestic
rather than the international law of jurisdiction should apply to cases
involving foreign litigants. In Section II.C, I attem.pt to determine
whether international jurisdiction law rnust be followed by dornestic
courts once it is proven applicable. Both determ.inations require that
we look to the paradigm that defines the relative spheres of authority
between the dom.estic and international orders.
The traditional sovereignty paradigm. defines these spheres of authority.67 This paradigm. views the habitable portion of the planet, with
few except ioris.P" as divided into sovereign states. Under the classic
form.ulation of this paradigm., each state is the u ltirnare and suprerne
political entity within its jurisdictional sphere.v? As such, all private

A crisis rnay also occur when there is a constitutional paracligm which conflicts with the
political and rnoral convictions of sorne social rnajori ry, Such a paracligm no longer solves
the general social or rnoral p roblern it was designed to solve.
Robert Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701, 745 (1989).
Lipkin has also applied Kuhn's theory of paradigrns to judicial decision rnaki ng. See Robert Justin
Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions 21 U. C. DAVIS. L. REV. 645 (1988).
"We are living in a rime of rapid global change, when the state system is undergoing profound
transforrnarion. Although the sovereignty paradrgrn is under considerable stress, I believe that
those aspects of it relevant to this Article will, subject to the qualifications I express (see infra
notes 68-72), rernain stable for the foreseeable future.
679 The social institution of the rnoderri sovereign state is generally considered to have fully
corne into being with the final dissolution of the Holy Rornan Ernpi re after the Thirty Years "War
in the 17th century. "What I terrn the sovereignty paradigm is cornrnorrly thought to have been
comprehensively described first in 1577 by French political theorist Jean Bodin in the classic Six
Livres de la Republique. JEAN BODIN, SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (Lyon, 1576). He defined
sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power within a State." JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF
THE COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955).
Many 17th-, 18th-, and 19th-century writers, including Hobbes, Pufendorf, Benrham, and
Austin, discussed sovereignty at great length. "While there were d isagreernenrs about the details
of the paradigm, there was considerable consensus as to its basic elements. (For a discussion of
the modern history of the concept of sovereignty, see generally CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM,
HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SoVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU (1900), and PETER N. RIESENBERG, THE INALIENABILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT (1956). For a
discussion of the history of the concept and its relationship to international law, see 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 124-26.
68. Though arguably habitable, Antarctica is not a state because it lacks a significant perrnanent population. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 201(c). For a discussion of the international status of Antarctica, see generally Brenda S. Thornton, Protecting Antarctica: Suggestions for
u.s. Implementation of Three Specific Areas Addressed in the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty, 11 "WIS. INT'L. L. REV. 49, 52 (1992).
"While of diminishing relevance today, the extent to which various protectorates and colonies
are regarded as states is arnbiguous. For the classic work discussing this issue, see 2 D.P.
O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967). See also
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-29 (2d ed. 1986). Military occupation does not
rerrninare statehood. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 201 reporters' note 3. For a
discussion of the arnb iguous legal status of Israeli-occupied territories, see Jallles L. Prince, The
International Legal Implications of the November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN.
J. INT'L. L. 681 (1989).
69. The first generally recognized attempt among jurists to apply the paradigrn explicitly to
create jurisdictional legal doctrine was done by Ulricus Huber, a Dutch jurist of the 17th century.
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In the 19th century Huber's work gained widespread exposure, particularly in the United States,
as a result of the writings of Joseph Story. For further explanation see ULRICUS HUBER, DE
CONFLICTU LEGUM, translated and reprinted in D. ]. LLEWELYN DAVIES, THE INFLUENCE OF
HUBER'S DE CONFLICTU LEGUM ON ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 49 (1937); Ernest
G. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifrations and the Conflict of Laws, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 271
(1920); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After,
48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 16 n.9, 16-17 (1934). For an explanation of Story's role in shaping the
jurisdictional rules specifically, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, ]r., A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 S. CT. REV. 241, 259-62.
The dominant classical view reflected in Huber and Story's work was that the state's jurisdictional sphere was almost exclusively defined by its territorial boundaries. Justice Marshall, writing
in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), articulated what became the classic
American description of this understanding:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed upon itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent
of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power
which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself.
Id. at 136.
For more on the American approach to the principle of territorial sovereignty, see generally,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 206(a), cmt. b. For a classic non-American statement of
this principle, see 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, § 169, at 564 (citing The S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk)
1927 P.C.I.]., (Ser. A) No.9, at 19 (Sept. 7, 1927) ("Now the first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to
the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory
except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. ").
This understanding of the state is implicit in the generally accepted definition of the state in
international law: "An entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the
control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 9, § 201 (1987); Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1,49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19. The notion that a defined territory and a permanent population must be under the
control of its own government is, in reality, nothing more than a designation that statehood is
the institutionalization of territorial jurisdiction.
Even in the earliest days, however, it was impossible to conform the state's exercise of
jurisdiction completely to its territorial boundaries. This is true for different reasons depending
upon the type of jurisdiction in question. International jurisdiction can be separated into three
analytically distinct categories: prescriptive jurisdiction, referring to the power of a state to
legislate or prescribe its substantive laws; enforcement jurisdiction, referring to the power of a
state to enforce its laws or perform executive acts; and adjudicative jurisdiction, referring to the
power of a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a dispute so as to render a judgment having
legal effect. For a better understanding, see the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, which is
organized according to these distinctions. Absolute adherence to the principle of exclusive territorial
jurisdiction in the prescriptive area has always been a practical impossibility. Activities that occur
outside of national boundaries often have effects within national boundaries. Acknowledging this,
international law is thought to allow states to restrict activities outside national boundaries that
have effects within national boundaries. In addition, based upon the somewhat competing idea
that sovereignty is primarily nationally rather than territorially defined (for a further discussion
of the implications of this distinction see supra note 109 and accompanying text), international
law has long accepted that states generally may delimit the activities of their own citizens even
when in foreign territories. Several other subsidiary principles of jurisdiction allow states to
prescribe laws extraterritorially. For a discussion of these, see generally Andreas Lowenfeld, Public
Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their
Interaction, 163 R.C.A.D.I. 311 (1979).
As much of this Article explains, the international legal right of states to exercise adjudicatory
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non-state actors?" com.ing within a state's jurisdictional sphere, and the
state's own internal organs of adm.inistration, are subject to the absolute exercise"! of that state's dom.estic authority. All that is left for
international law under this paradigm. is to govern relations between
these sovereign political entiries.F
jurisdiction used to be based on the territorial principle. Under the Anglo-Arnerican interpretation of this principle the forum could assert jurisdiction if the defendant could be served with
process within its territorial sphere. For further explanation, see part II.B.1. As a result of
econornic, legal, and technological changes, however, territoriality could no longer be used as the
basic principle for Iirniting state assertions of jurisdiction. See infra notes 91-95 and accotnpanying text. To dererrnirie whether a dispute falls within a state's jurisdictional sphere, courts instead
began to look at the nature of the contacts between the defendant and the forum, See supra notes
18-26 and accotnpanying text. For a discussion of the application of the principle of territoriality
to jurisdiction to enforce, see generally Strauss supra note 4.
70. Today under the restrictive form of foreign sovereign i mrrruniry, state actors that enter the
jurisdictional realrn of foreign states to engage in activities that are essentially private in character
are generally subject to the domesric jurisdiction of local courts. For exarrrple, a state-owned steel
cotnpany that establishes an office in a foreign country and leases office space from a local landlord
would not be irnrnune from suit for allegedly breaching the lease. In addition, such courts will
often apply local law pursuant to choice of law principles. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9,
ch. 5.
71. Post World War II developments in international hurnan rights law now place sorne
qualifications on such authority. Unfettered state discretion over individuals present within their
jurisdictional sphere is l im.ited by many international treaties and cusrornary norrns that directly
protect individuals from abuses by states. See, e.g., the rights defined in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Econornic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 V.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Prevention and Punishrnerit of the Cri me of Genocide, 1948, 78 V.N.T.S. 277.
In addition, since the principle was established in the Nuretnberg and Tokyo War tribunals,
individuals acting on behalf of states can, in their own capacity, be held responsible by the
international order for their violations of fundarnenral h uman rights. See, e.g., Iridictrnenr of War
Crirninals (Gerrnany), U.S. Dept. of State, TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS 23 (Dept. of State pub. no.
2420, European sere no. 10, 1945); Agreernent for the Prosecution and Punishrnenr of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472; International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947); Report on the
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia, ABA Task Force
(1993); Crisis in the Balkans, Part II: From Nuremberg to Bosnia-Should the U.N. Prosecute War
Criminals?, 1993 Annual ABA Meeting, Aug. 9, 1993; Jatnes O'Brien, The International Tribunal
for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639
(1993).
72. Given rnodern developments, this statement rnusr also be partially qualified. International
organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund,
as well as non- governmental organizations such as the Red Cross and Arrinesry International, are
generally acknowledged to be participants in the international legal order. It is still possible to
rnainrain a state-centric view that regards international organizations as nothing rrrore than
state-created treaty organizations, and non-governmental organizations as rnerel y interlopers in
the interstate order. But it is probably rnore accurate to recognize that actors other than states
have become rnajor players in the international system. In addition, rnultinarional corporations,
while forrnal ly still creatures of dornesric legal systems, nevertheless exert a profound influence
on the international sysrern, Theorists who have chosen to focus on this broadening of the
international order and on how global social interactions often transcend state-state relationships,
have begun, following the lead of Philip Jessup, refering to the global order as "transnational"
rather than "international." PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). See also LEONARD
LAZAR, TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND MONETARY LAW: TRANSACTIONS & CONTRACTS (Kenneth R. Sirnrnons ed., 1993); HENRY STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS,
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B. Applying the Sovereignty Paradigm to Determine the Applicable
Jurisdictional Law in International Cases
1. Jurisdiction Based on the Territorial Principle

During the era of territorial jurisdiction, docrririe-rnakers applied
the sovereignty paradigrn to dererrnine that international law circurnscribed the Iirnits on state assertions of personal jurisdiction. Pre-dating this century, it was cornrnon to think of personal jurisdiction as
defined by what is called territoriality, power, or sovereignty. The basic
concept was simple. If the defendant could be served with a surnrnons
within the territory of the forurn, jurisdiction was allowed, if not, it
was not. 7 3 This concept of personal jurisdiction flowed directly frorn
the traditional understanding of the state as a territorially defined
sovereign entity whose authority over activity within that territory was
exclusive and absolure.?? This requirernenr of service within the forum.
was a legacy of the requ.irernenr that jurisdiction over a defendant
could only be secured by actually seizing or arresting h irn within the
forutn pursuant to a writ of capias ad respondendum. Service cam.e to
stand for the sym.bolic .seiz.ure of the defendant."? Application of the
paradigm. was, therefore, very sirrrple , The underlying rationale of the
MATERIALS AND TEXT (1994); TRANSNATIONAL LAw IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF PHILIP c. JESSUP (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN,
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1964); PERCY E. CORBETr, THE GROWTH
OF WORLD LAw 184 (1971).
73. During the Roman and early medieval periods, before the rise of the modern, territorially
sovereign state, a court's adjudication of a dispute was premised on the parties' voluntary
submission of that dispute to the court. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Pouer" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296-97 (1956).
74. For a discussion of this understanding of the state, see supra note 69.
75. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (noting that capias
ad respondendum had given way to personal service but that "historically the jurisdiction of courts
to render judgements in personam is grounded in their de facto power over the defendant's person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition
of a judgment personally binding him."). Before the 16th century, if a defendant in England
refused to appear in court, his property could be attached, and continued refusal to appear would
result in eventual forfeiture. During the 16th century, the practice developed of arresting the
defendant. Keeping even the most defiant defendants in jail to ensure their presence at trial came
to be seen as unduly harsh and was replaced by a system of bail, and later by "symbolic" bail.
This eventually yielded to the concept of service of process. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228
U.S. 346 (1913), stating, in relevant part:
Ordinary jurisdiction over a person is based on the power of the sovereign asserting it to
seize that person and imprison him to await the sovereign's pleasure. But when that power
exists and is asserted by service at the beginning of a cause, or if the party submits to the
jurisdiction in whatever form may be required, we dispense with the necessity of maintaining
the physical power, and attribute the same force to the judgment or decree whether the
party remains within the jurisdiction or not. This is one of the decencies of civilization that
no one would dispute.
Id. at 353. See also 2 CASAD, supra note 26, § 2.02(2)(b). See generally Nathan Levy Jr., Mesne
Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 59-70 (1968).

1995 / Beyond National Law

395

territorial doctrine was the protection of the territorial integrity of
states against encroachm.ents by other states.?? For a state to allow a
fellow sovereign to "seize" sorneorie,"? or otherwise exercise judicial
process 78 within its territory was a direct threat to that state's sovereign
control over its territory, sirnilar in effect to a foreign occupation by
force. A jurisdictional law designed to protect the territory of states
from. encroachm.ents by other states obviously functions to govern
relations between sovereigns, and, therefore, fits com.fortably within
the am.bit of international law as defined by the paradigrn.??
. Evidence supports the conclusion that during the territorial era
courts within the United States interpreted the sovereignty paradigm.
to hold that international law prescribed jurisdiction between nationstates. That courts accepted international law as prescribing state jurisdiction is dem.onstrated by their m.any references to this fact in
resolving jurisdictional problem.s am.ong the "sovereign" states within

76. This understanding is reflected in the classic American decision that defined the territorial
era, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 u.s. 714 (1978), which stated:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State
in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be
deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse.
Id. at 720.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 432 cmt. b (discussing international law's
prohibition on foreign arrests).
78. For a discussion of international law's prohibition on the exercise of judicial process in
foreign states, see Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 145
(1973), in which the author states:
An act by one State in the territory of another is forbidden by international law if it is, by
its nature, an act which only the officials of the local State are entitled to perform, as opposed
to an act which private individuals may perform . . . . For [this reason} the officials of one
state may not sit as judges . . . in another state.
Id. at 146. States that are secure in their claim to sovereignty will sometimes consent to allow
foreign states to exercise judicial process within their territory. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 u.S.
1 (1956).
79. The protection of states from territorial encroachments by fellow states is one of the classic
subjects of international law. See Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1957):
International law protects the territorial sphere of each State through the principle of
non-intervention, in its different forms and applications. This is indeed one of the fundamental principles of international law-so much so, that, although it would be an exaggeration, and indeed seriously misleading to say so, it would not be without a certain element
of plausibility if it were contended that a State can do what it pleases provided only that it
avoids intervention in the territory or internal affairs of other States.
Id. at 1 70-71. See generally Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 232
R.C.A.D.I. 201 (1992) ("The delimitation of sovereignties is the very objective of public international law . . . . [The delimitation of jurisdiction} concerns the limits of State sovereignty
which is the very subject matter of public international law."). While the protection of territorial
sovereignty has always been important, from the formative period of the modern international
legal system in 1648 until this century, the resort to war, somewhat anomalously, was generally
thought to have been legal. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES 14-50 (rev. 1981).
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the United States. The most famous such reference is found in the
1874 case of Pennoyer v. Neff80 Justice Field derived the domestic
requirements for personal jurisdiction by analogizing the "well established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent [nation-} state over persons and property"81 to the United
States internal system created under the Constitution. He declared:
The several states of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect
independent, rnany of the rights and powers which originally
belonged to rhern being now vested in the governm.ent created by
the Constitution. But, except as restrained and l irnited by that
instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent
States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred
are applicable to rhern. One of these principles is, that every state
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its terrrtory.F

Pennoyer is only the most well-known of the many cases of the time
that, through such analogous reasoning, demonstrated the prevailing
belief that the international order prescribed the jurisdiction of nationstates. For exarnple, in 1850 the Supreme Court in DJArcy v. Ketchum 83
held that a state could refuse to give effect to a sister state's judgtnent
on the basis of a claim of lack of jurisdiction, proclairnirig: "We deetn
it to be free from controversy that these adjudications are in conformity
to the well-established rules of international law, regulating governrnenrs foreign to each other; . . . ."84 One cornrneritator who recently
canvassed the early personal jurisdiction cases concluded that courts
prior to Pennoyer consistently applied the international territorial principles of personal jurisdictiori.F'
80. 95 u.s. 714 (1877).
81. ld. at 722.
82. [d.
83. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
84. [d. at 174. See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 525 (1839)
(analogizing American states to nations for jurisdictional purposes); Peclcharn v. North Parish in
Haverhill, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 274, 286 (1834); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611-13 (C.C.
Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134); McQueen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5, 7 (N.Y 1819);
"Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886); Campbell v. "Wilson, 6 Tex. 379, 391 (1851); Phelps v.
Holker, 1 rxu. 261, 263 (Pa. 1 788); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. 1 786). For more
examples of such cases, see those cited in Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases ofJurisdiction,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1955) (cases addressing territorial l irnirs on judicial power in reference
to judgrnenrs, id. at 782 n.23; cases addressing territorial l irnirs on state power to grant divorces,
id. at 783 n.28; cases addressing territorial Iirnits on state power to tax, id. at 783 n.29; cases
addressing state power to legislate, id. at 783 n.30, 784 n.31).
85. Patrick J. -Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burriham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19,25 (1990). Another cornrnenrator sirn ilarly canvassed personal jurisdiction cases prior to Pennoyer, and concluded:
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While there appear to be no United States cases directly applying
the international law of personal jurisdiction to resolve truly international
jurisdictional questions during the territorial era, the absence of cases
is not surprising. Under the territorial approach, so fundam.ental and
well-established was the assumption that international law prohibited
states from. either establishing off-shore tribunals in foreign territories
or arresting civil defendants overseas, that states sim.ply did not engage
in such activities (unless occupying foreign territory in tim.e of war).
] urisdictional issues involving foreign civil defendants thus arose in
situations where the territorial integrity of a foreign state was not
physically breached by United States aurhorities.f'? Most cases involved
the nature and extent of the jurisdiction a state could exercise based
upon the presence of the defendant's person or property within that
state's terrirory."? In these cases, anyone or anything found in a state
of the United States was also found in the United States as a whole.
Therefore, once a court determ.ined that a dom.estic state forurn , such
as California, had jurisdiction under the Constitution, the United
States as a whole clearly had jurisdiction under international law, and
there was no need for courts to consider explicitly the international
dim.ension. While there is som.e controversy about whether the territorial
approach was com.m.only accepted before Pennoyer in the United Stares.s"

Under the principles of international law as understood by these American courts, one
country did not have authority over the citizens of another unless they or their property
were within the borders of the country. The courts used this concept of governmental
territorial authority as the basis for rules of personal jurisdiction.
John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in PersonalJurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1022 (1983).
86. This was not necessarily the case in actions against criminal defendants. For further
discussion, see Strauss, supra note 4, at 1249-56.
87. Notable cases among many include: Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); Freeman v.
Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (185,0); Holker v. Parker 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 436 (1813); Mills v. Duryee,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813); Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (C.P. Pa.
County Ct. 1938); Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194, 197 (N.Y 1811); Phelps v. Holker, 1 rxu.
261 (Pa. 1 788); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. 1 786). See also C. DRAKE, A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (6th ed. 1885); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Basis ofJurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775,782-784 nn.23-31 (1955)
(citing relevant cases).
88. The extent to which jurisdiction in the 19th century and earlier was actually grounded in
territoriality has been questioned. Professor Albert Ehrenzweig has argued that the American
doctrine of territorial jurisdiction was not settled law prior to Pennoyer. Ehrenzweig, supra note
73, at 308. Professor Geoffrey Hazard also maintains that the territorial concept of jurisdiction
never worked very well, and was invented by Joseph Story with little basis in case precedent.
Hazard, supra note 69. Professor James Weinstein has convincingly responded, however, that the
territorial approach to jurisdiction was, in fact, historically well accepted. James Weinstein, The
Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1 (1992). See
also, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), which
supported the assertion of jurisdiction over an individual based solely on presence within a forum
by referring to the traditional sovereign rights of states to exercise jurisdiction over everything
within their territory.
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and whether it was ever accepted in Europe.s? there is no doubt that,
to the extent it was accepted, it was believed that the international
law of jurisdiction was applicable.
2. Confusion: The Rise of Contacts Analysis and the Application of
Dornestic Jurisdictional Law
As a result of the new focus on the rights of defendants that
accom.panied the developm.ent of the contacts approach to jurisdict iori.?" courts began to believe that, under the sovereignty paradigm.,
the dornestic order prescribed all United States assertions of jurisdiction. The contacts doctrine was a response to economic, legal, and
technological changes that underrniried the ability, both dornestical ly
and internationally, to delineate exclusive territorial spheres of jurisdictional com.petence.
Critical to this doctrinal shift was the increasing prevalence of the
corporate form of economic organizatiori.?' and the corresponding increase in the nurnber of corporations that became defendants in civil
cases. Because corporations do not have a physical existence in the same
way that real persons do, the presence test could not be applied in an
increasing num.ber of cases. It was im.possible, for exam.ple, to precisely
say that a corporation was "in" the territory where it was incorporated
or where its subsidiaries were incorporated. The sam.e was true of where
its board of directors sat, where its principal place of business was,
where its factories were, where it sold its goods, or where its shareholders were. Great liberties were taken with the concept of presence,92
While there is clearly some historical ambiguity, a thorough discussion of the extent to which
the territorial approach to jurisdiction was accepted is well beyond the scope of this Article. For
our purposes, I believe it is safe to conclude that, while perhaps not universally held, territorial
concepts of jurisdiction were central to the concept of sovereignty as it was understood at that
time. See supra note 69.
89. Some commentators have inferred that territorialism never existed in the continental
European system. See, e.g., Friedrich J uenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and the
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1204 n.64 (1984). In most European
countries it is more difficult to derive the theoretical underpinnings of jurisdiction because,
following the French approach, fundamental principles of jurisdiction are codified and jurisdictional decisions are seldom reported. In addition, unlike the United States, most of the continental
countries were not federations of supposedly sovereign states. There was, therefore, no opportunity
when deciding cases involving the allocation of jurisdiction between domestic courts to make the
kind of international analogies made by u.S. courts. As in the United States, however, the concept
of territorial sovereignty was well established, and states simply were not in the habit of exercising
judicial process in foreign countries.
90. See discusion supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of the rise of the modern for-profit corporation, see ROBERT CLARK,
CORPORATE LAw 1 (1986).
92. One court, for example, interpreted corporate presence broadly, arguing that a corporation
has:
existence, vitality, efficiency, beyond the jurisdiction of the sovereign which created it,
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until finally the territorial doctrine evolved into the conceptually different doctrine of contacts that em.phasized connections to the forum.
rather than literal presence.
The rationale behind the presence approach was further underm.ined
by the evolving use of default judgm.ents. Courts began to proceed
with civil cases even if the defendant's physical presence before the
court could not be secured.f" Obviously, proceeding with a case when
the defendant was in another territory did not directly offend a foreign
sovereign in the sam.e way that either establishing a foreign judicial
presence or engaging in a foreign abducrion?" of the defendant would
have. 9 5
The developm.ent of the contacts basis for the exercise of jurisdiction
. was, therefore, an innovative response to the fact that it was no longer
possible in the case of corporations or necessary in the face of default
judgm.ents to m.aintain the strict territorial approach to jurisdiction.
Docrrine-makers, however, believing that the state's territorial jurisdictional character was imrnutable.P'' rationalized contacts jurisdiction
with the notion of consent. If an offshore defendant agreed to accept
the state's jurisdiction, then the state had a basis that was independent
of its own Iirnired territorial powers for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Applying the sovereignty paradigm. to this new rationalization,
doctrine-rnakers began to conclude that dom.estic rather than internaprovided it be voluntarily exercised. If it be said that all these acts are performed by its
agents, as they may be in the case of a private individual, and that the corporation itself is
not present, the answer is, that a corporation acts nowhere, except by its officers and agents.
It has no tangible existence, except through its officers. For all practical purposes, its
existence is as real, as vital, and efficient elsewhere as within the jurisdiction that created
it.
Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 25 N.].L. 57, 60-61 (N.]. 1885).
93. In England this procedure began in the 18th century. See Hazard, supra note 69, at 249.
94. For a discussion of the legality of an extraterritorial abduction in the criminal context, see
generally Strauss, supra note 4.
95. Commentators often note that the prevalence of the automobile was also responsible for
the demise of the territorial approach to jurisdiction in the United States. By the time a victim
of an automobile accident allegedly caused by an out of state driver was able to arrange for the
defendant driver to be served with process, the defendant was no longer (thanks to her car) within
the territory of the state. To circumvent this problem, courts developed the fiction that the
out-of-state driver had tacitly consented to suit in the state and had appointed the secretary of
state as her agent for service of process. See Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). See also St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
Automobiles, however, did not challenge the fundamental basis of territoriality in the way that
corporations or default judgements did. W"hile it may have been difficult to get jurisdiction over
out-of-state drivers, obtaining such jurisdiction was not conceptually incompatible with the
concept of territorial jurisdiction.
96. This was at least in part a legacy of the classical belief that the state, like man, was divinely
created. See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALI'IY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-16
(P.E. Corbett rrans., rev'd ed. 1968). See also] .M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF W"ESTERN LEGAL
THEORY (1992) (expounding on the reasons for this belief).

400

Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 36

tionallaw circum.scribed assertions of jurisdiction by the United States.
Because the contacts doctrine was justified by looking to the defendant's consent, doctrine-rnakers catne to view personal jurisdiction as
essentially about protecting defendants from. the unfairness of being
subject to assertions ofpcrwer by forum.s to whose jurisdiction they did
not in sorne way subrnir. In addition, because presence within a state's
territory was no longer the sine qua non of jurisdiction, and contacts
analysis had correspondingly developed to allow potentially rnore than
one state to exercise jurisdiction over the same rnatrer, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over an offshore defendant no longer affected the
nonforum. state's physical control over its own territory. Because the
concerns behind jurisdictional law, therefore, now focused on the relationship between sovereigns and private acrors,"? rather than the protection of the sovereign interests of the state.?" docrrine-makers cam.e
to assum.e that personal jurisdiction was, under the paradigm., exclusively a question of dom.estic law. This was, however, a m.isapplication
of the paradigm. based upon a failure to acknowledge the fundam.ental
change in the character of the state's jurisdictional powers that was
actually occurring. It is to resolving this confusion that I will now
turn.

97. In fact, while deemphasized in U.S. case law, jurisdiction continues to impact upon
considerations that transcend the concerns of private actors. See part II.B.3 for the explanation of
why jurisdiction is, even during the contacts era, inherently a matter of international concern.
See infra note 143 for an explantion of how U.S. minimum contacts cases deal with these broader
considerations within the u.S. domestic system. As part III of the Article, which presents the
normative case for the application of the international law of jurisdiction, makes clear, state
approaches to the exercise of jurisdiction in cases involving foreign litigants have a significant
effect on the overall effective functioning of the international judicial system.
98. One illustration of the transition from the state-concerned territorial approach to jurisdiction to the defendant-concerned contacts approach was the change in the rationale underlying the
requirement of service. Recall that, during the territorial era, service within the territory of a
sovereign was the symbolic legacy of the requirement that jurisdiction over a defendant could
only be secured by literally seizing him within the forum. See supra note 75 and accompanying
text. Originally, the concept of sovereignty dictated, as I have discussed, that states could only
arrest someone within their own territory. Service of process as a symbolic arrest continued under
the territorial theory of jurisdiction to be territorially limited under the same rationale. Originally,
one can imagine that notice to the defendant of a pending law suit was only a rather fortuitous
incidental benefit of his arrest. The concern was not primarily the interest of the defendant. See
Gerald Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L.
REV. 520, 533 (noting that judicial emphasis on fairness to defendants in jurisdictional matters
did not come to the fore until International Shoe). Pennoyer introduced the idea that service
performed the function, under the newly established 14th Amendment to the u.S. Constitution,
of giving the defendant notice of the suit against him. See Hazard, supra note 69 at 262-72
(1965). With the demise of the territorial approach to jurisdiction, service became more about
notice and less about symbolic arrest.
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3. Clarifying the Confusion: Why Jurisdiction Is Unique
As I have explained, faced with new, non-territorial assertions of
jurisdiction that were outside the state's traditional independent powers, doctrine-m.akers cam.e to base such jurisdiction on the defendant's
own consent to accede to the state's powers. This em.phasis on the
consent of the defendant led doctrine-rnakers to believe that, under the
paradigm., jurisdiction was now solely a question of dornestic law. As
I will demonstrate, however, because the consent rationale was not
based on the defendant's actual subrnission to a forum. that otherwise
would not have the independent power to assum.e jurisdiction, the
em.ergence of this new doctrine necessarily constituted a fundam.ental
alteration in the state's jurisdictional power. Because defining the
state's basic jurisdictional power is a rnatrer of interstate relations, I
will conclude that the international order rnust, under the paradigm.,
prescribe the laws that define state jurisdiction.
When parties to a dispute consent to the jurisdiction of a state that
otherwise would not have the power to exercise jurisdiction, the state's
own independent powers to exercise jurisdiction need not be expanded
for it to provide a forum. for the dispute. When consent, however,
becomes constructive, that is, as a rnatrer of law construed to exist
when the defendant engages in certain extraterritorial activities, then
the jurisdiction of the state is being fundam.entally altered to cover
those activities. While particular defendants m.ight, in certain respects,
choose whether to engage in such activities and thereby to enter the
newly defined jurisdictional realm. of the state, anyone who does engage
in such activity will be brought within the state's dom.ain.
Because docrr.ine-rnakers used this notion of constructive -consenr to
rationalize m.odern contacts jurisdiction, the rise of this new form. of
jurisdiction constituted an alteration of independent state powers. In
the early days of the development of contacts analysis, doctine-rnakers
atrernpred to constructively infer from. the actions of defendants their
consent to subm.it to state jurisdiction. For example, as a result of the
difficulty in applying the territorial approach to jurisdiction to corporat ioris.?? state assertions of jurisdiction over corporations were, for a
t irrie , prem.ised on the fiction that corporations had im.pliedly consented to the jurisdiction of every state where they conducted business.
In addition, jurisdiction over out-of-state rnororisrs was justified on the
theory that driving an autornobile within a state constituted im.plied
consent to be sued within that state.J?? This was, of course, a cornplere
m.anipulation of the concept. Most likely, only the rarest of corpora-

99. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 95.
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tions or rnor.orists truly intended by their actions to consent to such
j urisclict iori.!"! As the probleITl of justifying state jurisdiction with a
legal fiction became too obvious to ignore, doctrine-rnakers began to
develop an alternative constructive consensual rationale that allowed
the state to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction despite its Iirnired
territorial powers. If the defendant's contacts with the forum. were
sufficient to lead to the inference that she "purposefully availed herself
of the privileges and benefits of the forurn s laws," doctrine-m.akers
opined that she need not have actually consented to the forurn's jurisclicrion.I'P The perceived basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction became
a bargain: if the defendant takes advantage of the state's laws, then in
exchange, it is fair for the state to extend its jurisdiction over her.
While this new extension of jurisdiction rnight be justifiable as a
reasonable or fair extension of state power, it nevertheless was not based
on the defendant's actual submission to a forurn that would otherwise
not have had the independent power to assume jurisdiction. It therefore necessarily constituted a fundamental alteration of state powers.
"Fairness'U'l'' became a way of justifying an expansion of state power
based upon the belief that certain categories of defendanrs IP" and/or
activit ies-P? are intrinsically related to the independent nature of state
power. The understanding of the state that justifies the state's authority
to exercise personal jurisdiction within a particular realrn is, therefore,
101. This notion of consent is close to what Professor Ronald Dworkin criticizes as counterfactual consent. See generally, Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and
Posner, 1980 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (arguing that "the proposition that I would have consented
had I been asked is not consent at all").
102. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla 253 U.S. 235,357 (1958) (noting that a corporate defendant
has clear notice that it is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum court if it "purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state"); World-Wide
Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,295 (1980) (holding that personal jurisdiction was
not properly asserted over defendants who had "avail[ed] t hernselves of none of the privileges and
benefits of O'klahorna [the forurns} law"). Many other cases have relied on this language and
analysis.
103. While their formulation of the concept might be slightly different, Europeans also place
some reliance on fairness to legitimize personal jurisdiction. See generally Peter Hay, Transient
jurisdiction, Especially Over International Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court
of California, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 593 (1990):
Europeans deal with a person's relationship to the forum for jurisdictional purposes ranging
from domicile (in our scricr und technical sense), to habitual residence, to residence, and to
nationality. The last of these is regarded as the closest connection in SOITle legal systems,
although to Anglo-American countries and perhaps generally in practice, it ITlay be a rather
attenuated relationship when people have emigrated many years ago. The point is that
European jurisdictional law, just like its counterpart, seeks to identify the kind of connection
between a defendant and the forum that makes it fair C'riatural. justice" in English terms,
"due process" in American terms, or "rechtstaatlich" in German terms) to subject him or
her to local judicial jurisdiction. All this is common legal heritage and modern experience.
[d. at 599-600.
1 04. See supra note 25 and accompanying text discussing general jurisdiction.
1 05. See supra note 24 and accompanying text discussing specific jurisdiction.
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really no different than the understanding of the state that justifies its
authority to prescribe 'P? or enforce 'P? laws governing hum.an activity
within a particular realm.. All are ultim.ately dependent upon a certain
view of statehood that dictates within what parameters state assertions
of authority are Ieg it irnate.
For exarnple, it is still possible, and indeed cornrnon, to accept the
state as m.ost Ieg irirnarely a territorially defined sovereign entity. lOS
Alternatively, it is possible to accept the state as m.ost legitim.ately a
nationally defined sovereign ent ity.U'? Finally, it is possible to accept
the state as Ieg it imarely neither territorially nor nationally "sovereign"
but sitnply a convenient unit for localizing adrni nistrarion.!"?
Keeping in rnirid that the concept of sovereignty denotes suprem.e
and absolute political power,lll if one accepts the state as pritnarily a
territorially defined sovereign entity, then by definition this entity m.ay
legitim.ately assert jurisdiction over any defendant that actually com.es
within its territory for however brief a period of tim.e. 112 During the
106. For an explanation of prescriptive jurisdiction, see supra note 69.
107. For an explanation of enforcement jurisdiction, see supra note 69.
108. See generally supra note 69.
109. Many of the prominent 18th- and 19th-century continental philosophers emphasized this
understanding of the state. For example, Vattel saw the state as primarily an act of association or
social contract. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAw 13-14
(C. Fenwick trans. & ed., 1916) (1758). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his exploration of the philosophical basis of legitimate government in Le Contrat Social, makes clear that for him, sovereignty
resides in the almost metaphysical organism of the people who make up the state. JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, LE CONTRAT SOCIAL (1762), translated in ROUSSEAU: POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (F. Watkins ed. & trans., 1962). For Hegel, the all important human
spirit did not reside solely in the individual, but in the body politic as nationally-not terri rorially-defined. G.W.F. HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (1821), translated
in PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1942).
110. Many modern legal theorists are increasingly coming to this view of the state as solely
an administative unit. They emphasize that the primary value of planetary governance should be
the growth of human dignity and development, not the preservation and adulation of the artificial
entity known as the state. They see the concept of sovereignty as a convenient way to justify the
violation of fundamental human rights, an impediment to coherent planetary governance, and as
a cause of war. This has been a major theme of discussion in international law. While there are
far to many works to list, for an interesting sampling, see generally JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAw
OF NATIONS 54 (6th ed. 1963); RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAw (1989);
EUNOMIA ALLOTT, NEW WORLD ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 416-19 (1990); ALEXANDRE C.
KISS & DINAH SHELTON, Systems Analysis of International Law: A Methodological Inquiry, 17 NETH.
YB. INT'L L. 45 (1986).
111. Black's Law Dictionary defines sovereignty as follows:
The Supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will; paramount control of the constitution
and frame of government and its administration; the self-sufficient source of political power,
from which all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a state,
combined with the rights and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign
dictation; also a political society, or state, which is sovereign and independent . . . .
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
112. It is a direct appeal to this definition that justifies the exercise of jurisdiction in Justice
Scalia's opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 u.S. 604 (1990):
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territorial era the state's power to exercise jurisdiction within its territory was based precisely upon this understanding of the state. 1 1 3 If
we believe that it is reasonable or fair for such a territorial definition
to be expanded to include the ability to assert jurisdiction over any
defendant whose actions have certain effects within that territory, then
by definition the forum. can assert jurisdiction over an offshore defendant who, for example, sells products that cause harm. within the
terr'itory.J!" This is essentially the fundam.ental jurisdictional principle
that underlies the rniriirriurn contacts test.
If one sees the state as Ieg it irnately a nationally defined sovereign
entity, then depending upon how we define national sovereignty, it can
be regarded as "fair" for this entity to assert jurisdiction over all
rnatrers concerning its nationals. We could define national sovereignty
as only including the ability for the sovereign to exercise jurisdiction
over its own nationals. If we believe that it is reasonable or fair,
however, for such a national definition to be expanded to include what
is called passive nationality, then by rnerely interacting with a national,
one could by definition enter the sovereign's jurisdictional arnbi c.U"
Finally, if one only accepts the state as legitim.ately an adrniriistrative unit, then the focus of fairness changes from. t he relationship
between the defendant and this sovereign political entity to what

The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due
process standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
lei. at 619. The territorial principle of jurisdiction has traditionally been applied in U.S. personal
jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 u.S. 235 (1958):
[Restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending
in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
lei. at 251. The most extreme use of the territorial principle is found in Grace v. MacArthur, 1 70
F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (holding that an individual could be served with papers while on
an airplane over the jurisdiction). But see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 u.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and
protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter
of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.").
113. See supra note 69 and text accompanying notes 73-78.
114. The effects doctrine is an expansion of the territorial approach to jurisdiction that is
traditionally used to justify prescribing laws covering offshore activities that cause effects within
the territory. The doctrine, however, can be applied to personal jurisdiction and, as I indicate
above, is essentially the fundamental jurisdictional principle that underlies the minimum contacts
test.
115. The passive nationality principle is an expansion of the national approach to jurisdiction
that is traditionally used to justify prescribing laws prohibiting foreign nationals from causing
harm to a sovereign's nationals. Like the effects doctrine, however, this doctrine can also be applied
to personal jurisdiction. In fact, this is exactly what the French have done with articles 14 and
15 of the French Civil Code. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. For further explanation
of the principles of passive nationality, see generally 1 OPPENHEIM supra note 9, at 138.
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becornes exclusively a balancing of different factors of convenience.
Because there is no longer a "sovereign" territorial entity to be "entered" the concept of presence as an absolute basis for jurisdiction
becomes meaningless. Likewise, if there is no nationally "sovereign"
orgariisrn, nationality or passive nationality can no longer define its
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction can no longer be based on the relationship
between the defendant and the nonexistent "sovereign."116 Rather, deterrnining whether the exercise of jurisdiction by particular courts is
Ieg it imate rnust now be done with reference to such questions as
whether the defendant has to travel further than the plaintiff, or
whether localized adjudication most effectively allows for those judicial
officers rnost fam i liar with applicable law to officiate.I '?
If determ.ining the personal jurisdictional realm. of states is, once
freed of the confusion about consent, conceptually synonornous with
defining the state and its corresponding powers, the question then
becomes whether the sovereignty paradigrn provides that the law that
defines the state and its powers should COll1e from the international
order. Because of the unique character of jurisdiction, the prescription
of state jurisdictional Lirnirs differs from. other subjects of international
regulation. This is because jurisdiction, understood as a question of
fu.ndarnerrtal.ly defining the state and its powers, involves both the
internal problell1 of delirniting a state's "dornestic" realrn of authority
over private actors, as well as the external problell1 of delirniting lines
of authority between states. Under the rerrns of the paradigm., however,
the international order properly prescribes the law that defines state
jurisdiction. This is because individual states are furrdarnerrtal.ly incapable of unilaterally generating the law that governs interstate jurisdiction for exactly the same reasons that they are incapable of prescribing other laws that we classically think of as regulating relations
between states. The subject rnarrer to be regulated is intrinsically a
rnarrer of interstate relations requiring collective prescription by states
working together in the international arena. When states unilaterally

116. Currently, when factors of convenience are taken into account, for example to the extent
they are in the U.S. minimum contacts test, see infra note 143, it does not mean that the sovereign
has ceased to exist. The sovereign itself is still the entity that asserts jurisdiction and defines the
forum.
11 7. The concept of statehood is in flux, and it would be wrong to conclude that any particular
state is expecially committed to anyone of the three conceptions of statehood. Interestingly,
however, the United States, one of the most nationally heterogenous countries in the world, but
one that enjoys a strong sense of territorial sovereignty, continues over international objections
to adhere to the principle of jurisdiction based on transient territorial presence (see supra note
112). In contrast, France, a country known for its sense of national identity, provides in articles
14 and 15 of its civil code for French courts to assert jurisdiction over any case where there is a
French plaintiff, also over international objections. See supra notes 56-59 and 115, and infra notes
154-159 and accompanying text.
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atrernpt to prescribe the law that defines their own jurisdiction, they
inherently participate in a broader transnational process of state definition. Because the state is the basic unit of political separation into
which the global cornrrnrn.iry divides itself, any arrernpr to proclailll a
certain jurisdictional division of responsibilities is necessarily an act
i mpacting upon the division of responsibility of all rnernbers of the
comrnurrity, As a corollary to staking out claims to their own jurisdiction, states act to expand or restrict the jurisdictional space open to
other states, thereby i rnpficitly participating in the definition of other
states' jurisclict ion.U" Despite the fact, therefore, that personal jurisdictional is no longer, for the rnost part, concerned with the international issue of protecting territorial sovereignty, it continues to be
about the larger international question of defining state power. Thus,
while the regulation of private actors within a state's jurisdictional
sphere is, under the sovereignty paradigrn, the subject of domestic law,
the dererrriination of the am.bit of that sphere itself is inherently the
subject of international law.
Practically speaking, because of this intrinsically international character of state jurisdiction, only the international order can authoritatively create the law that prescribes the jurisdiction of states. Because
a state's international jurisdictional claim is subject to other states' own
understanding of the state, there is no way for states operating solely
within the separate confines of their individual dornestic orders to
dererrni ne whose understanding should prevail. Even under the present
systern of jurisdictional self-prescription states wishing to resolve conflicts
find them.selves with little choice but to resort ultim.ately to the
international order. When a state's unilaterally prescribed assertion of
jurisdiction offends other states' views of statehood, those states operating in accordance with institutionalized international processes will
forrnal ly or iriforrnal ly object. To the extent that the "offending" state
wishes the other states to cooperate with it on jurisdiction or other
matrers, it will take their concerns into consideration. Once, either
before or as a result of such d iplornatic procedures, a state's novel
jurisdictional clairn is accepted by other states, those states will be
encouraged to rnake sirnilar clairns and new international jurisdictional
norrns will emerge. Presently this is how the international law of
jurisdiction is being creared.U?

118. This is true even to the extent that states today tend to view their personal jurisdictional
realms as overlapping and nonexclusive. To claim a specific, nonexclusive jurisdictional realm is
nevertheless to endorse a certain view of state authority, and to limit the space open to the exclusive
jurisdiction of other states.
119. For an explanation of custom and treaty as the two primary sources of international law,
see supra note 1 5.
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The fact that the process of defining the personal jurisdictional
powers of the state is, even under the present system., inherently
international, does not lessen the extent to which doctrine-m.akers are
confused in believing that states can self-prescribe t heir jurisdiction.
In fact, it is precisely because jurisdiction is intrinsically international
that the paradigm. requires it to be prescribed by the international
order, and that dom.estic courts should apply such international law as
authoritative in cases involving foreign plaintiffs or defendants. There
is no reason why this should be any less the case when it com.es to
jurisdiction than when it com.es to any other area of law appropriately
prescribed by the international order. For instance, doctrine-m.akers
clearly accept that the law governing the use force by one state against
another state is intrinsically a question of interstate relations that,
under the paradigm., can only be prescribed by the international order. 12 0 A United States congresswom.an whose world view was inform.ed by the sovereignty paradigm., for exam.ple, would be very
unlikely to consider proposing legislation prescribing the international
legality of uses of force by the U nited States against foreign nations. 121
If, however, states did begin to self-prescribe legislative schem.es to
govern this intrinsically international concern, as is the case with
jurisdiction, they would ultim.ately be forced to com.pensate for their
actions by circuitously establishing international standards. Just as it
is clear that such a convoluted approach would be inconsistent with
the straight-forward division of regulatory responsibility provided by

120. The United Nations Charter is today the primary international instrument governing the
circumstances under which states can use military force against other states. See generally art. 2(4)
(prescribing that, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.") and art. 51 (providing that,
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."). For some
well known works discussing these as well as other subsidiary instruments prescribing when states
can resort to military force see generally LORI DAMROSCH & DAVID SCHEFFER, LAw AND FORCE
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, (1991); LOUIS HENKIN, RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, (1990); ¥ORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENSE, (1994); RICHARD FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD, (1968); IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, (1981); DEREK BOWETT,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, (1958); Oscar Schacter, In Defense of International Rules
on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986).
121. This should not be confused with whether or not national legislatures have the abili ty
under the paradigm to prescribe legislation directing the state to violate international· law.
Generally, as would be true in directing the state to use force, such legislative action would not
be inconsistent with a well accepted interpretation of the powers that states have under the
sovereignty paradigm called "dualism". For a full discussion of why the doctrine of dualism cannot
under the paradigm be extended to allow states to break international jurisdictional law, see part
II.C.
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the sovereignty paradigm., dornesric prescription of the law that governs interstate jurisdiction is equally inconsistent with the paradigm..
As an alternative to focusing on the inherently transnational nature
of state jurisdiction, independent corroboration that states cannot under the paradigm. self-prescribe their jurisdiction is provided by an
analysis of the basic m.eaning of the concept of jurisdiction itself. For
an entity not to have jurisdiction rneans that it is precluded from.
exercising authority in a particular area. This necessarily entails externally defined objective lim.its. Without external lim.its, an entity m.ay
still decide, legislatively. or otherwise, not to exercise authority in a
particular area. Because such a decision is subject to the entity's own
discretion and could be changed by it at any tim.e, however, the entity
could not be said to be truly precluded from. acting or, therefore, truly
lacking in jurisdiction. This m.eans that the law that circurnscribes the
state's jurisdiction m.ust originate from. outside of the state itself. 1 2 2
Thus, as between the two orders provided by the sovereignty paradigm., only the international order can prescribe the law of jurisdiction.
Following the erroneous analytical path that conceives of jurisdiction as prim.arily about fairness, doctrine-m.akers have conceptually
bypassed this contradiction between the nature of jurisdiction and state
jurisdictional self-prescription. Jurisdiction understood as based upon
the absolute ideal of fairness conceives of the external lim.its inherent
in jurisdiction as com.ing from. an independent, objectively established
natural law standard of justice that absolutely allows or disallows
jurisclict.iorr.V'' This natural law, however, becomes dornestic rather
122. To avoid confusion, it is important to clearly identify the relevant jurisdictional entity.
While the state is not external to itself and, therefore, cannot define the extent of its own
jurisdiction, it is external to and, therefore, can define the jurisdiction of its own internal organs,
including its courts. Personal jurisdiction, however, is about the jurisdiction of the state and not
the court. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction that, in the American system, allocates authority
between different courts, personal jurisdiction is about the forum state's authority to exercise
regulatory control over the defendant. While the discourse surrounding personal jurisdiction has
developed to sometimes interchangeably refer to "the jurisdiction of the court," and "the jurisdiction of the forum," it is only about the jurisdiction of the court in the sense that the court is
the particular institution of the forum state called upon to act on the state's behalf. The Restatement
ofjudgments draws the distinction as follows:
Although a State has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it may not have given
to a particular court or it may not have given to any of its courts power to entertain the
action. In such a case the court has no "competency" to render a valid judgment.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF JUDGMENTS § 7 cmt. a at 41 (1942).
123. The idea that there exists a "natural" body of law whose claim to legitimacy, unlike
man-made positive law, is that it is ultimately true has classical roots. Aristotle was one of the
first -Western thinkers to recognize a pre-ordained distinction between the written law of man
and a universal natural law that is "permanent and changeless, impartial as to the human
condition." H. MCCOUBREY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURALIST LEGAL THEORY 28-30, 37
(1987) (quoting ARISTOTLE, ETHICS O.A.K. Thomson rrans., revd by Tredennick, Penguin
Classics). Reflecting the medieval mind, Thomas Aquinas maintained that natural law (jus
naturale) had its foundation in the divine and was given to man so that he might reasonably
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than international law because, despite its sublim.e origins, it is currently transform.ed into positive law through the institutional processes
of the dom.estic order. 124
Not surprisingly, when the jurisdictional question is freed from. the
confusion about fairness and approached as a pure question of defining
state powers, doctrine-m.akers following the sovereignty paradigm. accept that the definition of the state com.es from. international law. 12 5
For exam.ple, there is general agreem.ent that, for an entity to legitirnarely exercise the powers of statehood, it m.ust either m.eet the
globally agreed upon criteria for statehood'F" or be recognized by the
international com.m.unity as m.eeting these criteria.l " Only when it
com.es to the law of jurisdiction, which has been erroneously disconnected from. the concept of independent state powers, do states incongruously attem.pt to self-define their own international powers.
govern society and see to it that the nations within this society come to some agreeable common
ground. Id. at 46-54, 60 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 1a 2ae, 92:1). In
the 17th century, the English philosopher John Locke agreed with the premise that natural law
comes from a supreme being. Locke's major contribution, however, was his strong emphasis on
human reason as the prime tool for deriving such law. 2 JOHN LOCKE, ~O TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT ch. II, § 6 (Peter Laslett rev'd ed., 1963).
124. Existentially speaking, natural law cannot be confined to either the domestic or international realms. Its claim to legitimacy is not that it is the properly derived product of either
institutional order, but that it is ultimately "true." In a practical sense, however, the current
institutional division between the international and domestic system requires that natural law be
realized and then accepted as law within the context of one or the other. While clearly subordinate
to positive law, natural law continues to be accepted as a source of international law.
125. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 201 (referring to the state as defined
under international law). In addition, signatory states presumed to internationally define the
powers of statehood when they established the definition of the state pursuant to a multilateral
treaty. See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, supra note 69. The
Restatement (Third) also specifically identifies only international law as the source of the state's
jurisdictional powers referred to as, "Capacities, Rights and Duties of States". Not surprisingly,
these powers first and foremost include the basic territorial and national jurisdictional character
of the state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 206 ("Capacities, Rights and Duties of States.
Under international law, a state has: (a) sovereignty over its territory and general authority over
its nationals . . . . ").
126. The declaratory theory regarding international law requirements for statehood maintains
that a political entity is a state if it meets the criteria of statehood. See J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood
in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 9, 13-15 (1991) (explaining the declaratory theory
of statehood and quoting Alan James for the theory's basic premise: "Recognition presupposes a
state's existence; it does not create it.") (citation omitted).
127. The constitutive theory regarding international law requirements for statehood asserts
that a political entity is a state if it is recognized as such by existing states. See ide at 16-20
(explaining the constitutive theory of statehood and quoting L. Oppenheim for the theory's basic
premise: "A state is, and becomes, an International Person through recognition only and exclusively.") (citation omitted). As J.D. van der Vyver explains:
Statehood, in a word, is the key for political entities of the kind under consideration to gain
entry into the domain that is governed by public international law . . . . A political
community only constitutes a state for purposes of international law inasmuch as other states,
through recognition and by entering into international relations with that political community, permit it to participate in the areas governed by international law.
Id. at 11.
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Of what consequence is this failure by docrririe-makers to correctly
derive jurisdictional doctrine from. the sovereighty paradigrn? As whenever doctrine-m.akers fail to adequately perform. their positivist m.ission
of accurately ascertaining legal doctrine from. underlying paradigm.s,
the cost is a weakening of social institutions. In this case, it is a
weakening of the coherent division of responsibility between the dornest ic and international orders that the sovereignty parad.igrn supports.
C. The Dualist Interpretation of the Sovereignty Paradigm: Can States
Disregard the International Law ofJurisdiction?
1. The Nature of Dualisrn
Having established that international law, rather than dornestic law,
appropriately governs state assertions of jurisdiction in cases involving
foreign litigants does not necessarily rnean that state courts rnust apply
this law. Many countries, including the United States, ascribe to a
dualist conception of the relationship between domestic and international law. This conception allows that states ITlay direct their courts
not to apply international law. As we have seen, the sovereignty
paradigm. holds that dom.estic law is created by states to regulate
private actors operating within their jurisdictional realm., and international law is created by the international order to regulate sovereigns
in their relationship with each other. The dualist rnoclel of the relationship between dornestic and international law interprets the sovereignty paradigrn to rnean that these two types of law are produced by
legal sysrerns that are totally separate and d isri nct..V" Because, under
this view, the dornestic system. is totally self-contained, it is charged
with creating its own cornprehensive body of law, and, rnost irnportantly, dornestic courts are Iirnired to applying this dornestic law.
In reality, the domesric and international systerns do not function
com.pletely independently of each other. At t irnes, laws that govern
interstate relations irnpact upon the rights or obligations of private
actors. As this Article has dernonsrrated, personal jurisdiction in cases
involving foreign litigants is a good example of a situation where the
128. Commentators that support dualism point to the fact that each order has its own separate
body of law, and each has its own distinct law applying institutions. International law is created
by states through procedures that manifest their consent either explicitly through treaties or
implicitly through customary practice. In contrast, domestic law comes exclusively from the
domestic system. In the United States, legislatures, administrative agencies, and tribunals, to
name a few, are all law-making institutions. International legal problems are thought to be largely
resolved through international dispute resolution mechanisms, such as diplomacy, international
arbitration, or the International Court of Justice, while domestic legal problems are thought to
be largely resolved in national legal institutions, most notably domestic courts.
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international order should be thought of as prescribing laws that
irnpact upon private actors. Other legal norms that are well accepted
as international law but that irnpact upon private actors, and are
therefore applied in dornest ic courts, include the protection of diplom.ats,129 the punishm.ent of pi racy130 and rerrorisrn.l ' ! the extradition
129. The customary international law of diplomacy was first codified in the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force
June 24, 1964; for the U.S. December 13, 1972). The customary international law of consular
immunity was later codified in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 V.N.T.S. 261. For representative domestic case law applying the laws of diplomatic and consular immunity, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, §§ 464-466 and reporters' notes. See also E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1976); Ernest L. Kerley, Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on
Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (1962).
130. Piracy has long been considered criminal under international law. United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 W"heat.) 153, 161-62 (1820). See also D.H.N. Johnson, Piracy in Modern International
Law, 43 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 63 (1957). The customary international law
of piracy was first internationally codified by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. See 2 A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAws, REGULATIONS, AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES (Frances
Deak & Philip C. Jessup eds., 1939), for the text of the Declaration. It was subsequently codified
at articles 14-22 of the Convention of the High Seas of 1958. Convention of the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, arts. 14-22, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force in U.S. Sept. 30,
1962). In 1982 these provisions were superseded by articles 100-110 of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signiture Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 100-110, UN Doc.
A/Conf. 62/122 reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
Nineteenth-century U.S. courts addressing cases of piracy directly applied the customary
international law of piracy. E.g., United States v. Chapels, Fed. Cas. No. 14,782 (C.C. Va. 1819);
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 W"heat.) at 153 (addressing piracy charge and applying international law);
Marianna Flora~ 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1825); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); The Ambrose Light, 25 F. Supp. 408,423-28
(S.D.N.Y 1885). Today, U.S. courts instead largely apply treaty or domestic statutes that are
substantively the same as the customary international law of piracy. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661
(1988) (incorporating by reference customary international law of piracy). See generally ALFRED
RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 122-200 (1988) (for an historical treatment of American municipal
law on the subject).
For representative foreign cases applying the international law of piracy, see Kid Dawson's Trial,
13 How St. Tr. 451 (1696); Kidd's Trial, 14 How St. Tr. 123 (1701); Bonnet's Trial, 15 How.
St. Tr. 1231 (1718); The Republic of Bolivia v. The Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance
Company (1909] K. B. 785; In re Piracy Jure Gentium, (1934] AC 586; 7 ILR 213. See also 1
OPPENHEIM supra note 9 (citing relevant sources); Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy
Obsolete?, 38 BARV. L. REV. 334 (1925) (citing relevant sources).
131. Acts of terrorism are illegal under customary international law. See ALBERT PARRY,
TERRORISM: FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ARAFAT 1-11 (1976); I R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISMDOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 71 (1979). Cf Recognition of Need of
Member States to Cooperate in Combating Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61,40 U.N. GAOR, 40th sess., Supp.
No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985). The vast majority of customary international law
addressing acts of terrorism has recently been accepted by seven nations including the United
States as an agreement to punish and condemn terrorism. Convention to Prevent and Punish the
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of
International Significance, (Feb. 2, 1971) 27 U.S.T. 3949; T.I.A.S. 8413.
For a modern case where American courts applied the international law of terrorism, see Ahmad
v. Wigen, 726 E Supp. 389, 402 (E.D.N.Y 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1054 (1990) (listing
evidence of the international law of terrorism). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 9,
§ 404, cmt. a, reporters' notes 1 (1987) (citing relevant cases). In the United States today a federal
law that is similiar in many respects to customary international law proscribes terrorism. Title X
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of crim.inal suspecrs.l F the seizure of fishing and other sm.all com.m.ercial vessels in tim.e of war,133 and the validity in foreign courts of the
acts of regim.es purporting to be governrnents.U'? Most countries where
the dualist m.odel has been adopted, including the United States, have
found the doctrine of incorporation a conceptually tidy way to apply
international law within the confines of the m.odel's rigid separation of
the dom.estic and international system.s. This doctrine of dom.estic law
provides that international law should, where relevant, be automat-

of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988-1989. Pub. L. 100-204,
§§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-5203 (West. Supp. 1988).
The courts of some foreign countries also apply the customary international law of terrorism.
E.g., Government of Belgium v. Postlethwaite, 2 All E.R. 985 (1987) (Eng.); R v. Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1 ~L.R 1204
(1988) (Eng.). Cf Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell, 3 All E.R.
1140 (1978) (Eng.).
132. International law generally does not require nations to comply with other nations'
requests for extradition of criminal suspects. 2 OPPENHEIM supra note 9, § 415. Many countries,
however, have entered into various bilateral and multilateral treaties that require states to
extradite certain categories of fugitives upon request. [d. § 416.
The United States has entered into extradition treaties with most of the world's nations, and
such extradition treaties are directly applied in U.S. courts. For examples of U.S. cases applying
extradition treaties, see those cited at RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 475, reporters'
notes 1-6.
Courts of foreign countries also apply extradition treaties. Some of the more well known cases
include Re Petalas, 22 I.L.R. 519 (Conseil d' Erat 1955) (Fr.); Re Garcia Setien, 43 I.L.R. 244
(Court of Cassation 1963) (Belg.); Kakias v. Cyprus, 2 All E.R. 634 (1978) (Eng.); Government
of Denmark v. Nielson, 2 All E.R. 81; 74 I.L.R. 458 (1984) (Eng.); United States Government
v. McCaffery, 2 All E.R. 570 (1984) (Eng.).
On extradition generally, see I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971);
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974).
133. When countries are at war, customary international law prohibits them from capturing
the coastal fishing boats and small merchant vessels belonging to citizens of opposing countries.
The Paquete Habana, 1 75 U.S. 677, 698 (1900). This customary prohibition was first codified
in article III of the Hague Convention XI of 1907. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, Oct. 18,1907, art. 111,36 Stat. 2277.
United States courts have directly applied international law when adjudicating cases of this
type, i.e., prize cases. E.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Schooner Adeline,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244 (1815); Penhallow v. Doane's Admrs., 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 54 (1795).
There are many instances of foreign courts also applying international law in this area. See, e.g.,
Schiffart-Treuhand, G.m.b.H., and Others v. H.M. Procurator General, Privy Council, 1953 App.
Cas. 232, 1953 All E.R. 364; and, Lever Brothers and U'ni lever N.V. v. H.M. Procurator General,
Re: S.S. Unitas, 1950 App. Cas.536, 1950 All E.R. 219.
134. The actions of a national government arguably must be given deference in foreign courts
under international law pursuant to the "Act of State" doctrine. This doctrine holds that:
(T]he courts of one state do not, as a rule, question the validity or legality of the official
acts of another sovereign state . . . insofar as those acts involve the exercise of the latter
state's public authority, purport to take effect within the sphere of the latter's own jurisdiction, and are not in themselves contrary to international law.
1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 365-66. Courts within the United States historically directly
applied the Act of State Doctrine. E.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Today they
give force to the Act of State Doctrine, but claim that it emanates from "constitutional underpinnings" not from international law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964).
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ically incorporated directly into dom.estic law. Thus, international law
is not applied as international law, but as incorporated dom.estic law.
In the United States, international law is seen to be incorporated
directly into federal law. 135
Why not sim.ply apply international law directly where appropriate,
rather than first im.posing this artificial separation of the dom.estic and
international system.s by inventing the doctrine of incorporation? While
this question has been a hot subject of theoretical debate for most of
this century,136 practically speaking, states adhere to this conceptual
structure because it allows for rhern to apply international legal norrns
when they are necessary to resolve a dispute properly, while at the sarne
tim.e uniquely m.aintaining their ability, free of interference by dom.estic courts, to disregard international law when they deem. it necessary.137
'
Domestic authorities applying the d'ualisr model could COlTIe up
with any systern for directing their courts when to apply international
law. In the United States, the rnost doctrinally accepted way to direct
courts not to apply international law is through the passage of federal

For foreign cases applying the Act of State doctrine as international law, see AM Luther Co.
v. Sajor & Co., 3 K.B. 532 (1921) (Eng.); Bank Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij and
Twentsche Bank, 30 I.L.R. 28 (Neth. Hof. Amsterdam 1959); Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294
F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir, 1961); Epoux Reynolds v. Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 47 I.L.R. 53 (Fr.
Trib. gr. i nst , 1965).
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 111, reporters' notes 2, 3 (addressing the
incorporation of treaty law and customary international law, respectively).
136. For an explication of the classic arguments, see J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the
Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. YB. INT'L. L. 66 (1936); Josef L. Kunz, The "s/ienn« School"
and International Law, 11 N.YU. L. REV. 370, 399 (1934); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 446--47 (1952).
137. In the United States, doctrines of judicial preclusion also prevent courts from interfering
with the state's ability to violate international law. Frequently the doctrine of standing is invoked
by courts to prevent a plaintiff from asserting an international legal claim on his own behalf.
Since all violations of international law ultimately have some effect on real persons, courts have
been faced with having to decide when private actors have a legally cognizable interest in making
an international claim. "When interpreted narrowly, this doctrine of standing, consistent with the
general division between the domestic and international systems, only prevents state courts from
becoming involved with disputes that are best characterized as between states. If interpreted
expansively, however, this doctrine has the potential to preclude all international law from being
applied in dornestic courts.
Occasionally, courts within the United States have also declined to decide cases that require
the application of international law on the explicit grounds that they do not wish to interfere
with what they regard as essentially "political questions." See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 283
F. Supp. 336, 342 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 41 7 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969). Such questions, they
have held, are best left to the discretion of the political branches of government. For a very
interesting discussion and criticism of this doctrine as it is applied by courts within the United
States to exclude the use of international law, see THOMAS FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS,
JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992).
"When the application of treaty law specifically is in question, courts look to whether the treaty
was substantively intended to be domestically applied. If so, the treaty is referred to as self-executing.
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Iegislation.U" Since United States dornesric law holds that a later-int irne federal law takes precedence over an earlier-in-tirne federal law,
by passing legislation inconsistent with a previous international legal
obligation, the United States political branches direct the courts to
give effect to the later-in-tim.e dom.estic law over the earlier-in-tim.e
incorporated international law. As an extension of the sam.e theory,
because the Constitution is always supreme to other federal law, it is
also thought to be suprem.e to international law and would take
precedence over such law in dornestic courts. 139
2. Why]urisdiction Is Unique Redux: A Jurisdictional Exception
to the 'Dualisrn Model
Failing to understand why jurisdiction is unique, one could reach
the conclusion that the concept of dualism allows states to prescribe
laws to direct local courts to disregard international jurisdictional law.
In the United States, such a result would be accornpfished by direction
of the Constitution 140 or federal legislation. The concept of clualisrn ,
however, cannot be applied to allow the state to prescribe jurisdictional
law in international cases.
The sovereignty paracligrn holds that states are the u ltirnare and
suprerne political entities within their jurisdictional realrns. Dualistn
interprets this to rnean that states are self-contained, auroriornous
political entities with the capacity to clererrnine which laws their own
courts and other adrrrinistrative institutions will follow. While the
138. In the United States, questions have also emerged as to whether judicial decisions as well
as presidential actions and decrees take precedence over international law in courts within the
United States. Authority most often cited for the proposition that they do take precedence is the
famous Supreme Court dicta in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, that "[f)or [the purpose
of applying international law as a part of our law} where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations." For additional reference, see supra text accompanying note 61.
Courts have generally not attempted to issue directives superseding international law based
solely on their own authority. On several occasions, however, courts have been presented with the
question of whether to give deference to an executive action in violation of international law.
Courts have at times found that executive actions or decrees should be given precedence in
American courts over international law. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
A general executive power to violate international law has been persuasively criticized by several
commentators as being inconsistent with our own domestic constitutional order. If the executive
cannot constitutionally violate purely domestic law, these commentators question the power of
the executive to violate incorporated domestic law. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853,878-79
(1987); Michael Glennon, Comment, State-Sponsored Abductions: A Comment on United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. ]. INT'L. L. 746 (1992).
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 111 CITlt. a.
140. See infra note 142 (discussing the role or, perhaps better stated, lack of the role of the
U.S. Constitution in proscribing the jurisdiction of the United States in cases involving foreign
parties).
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sovereignty paradigm. gives the state the ability to control its own
internal organs of adm.inistration, this control cannot extend to directing these organs to define the state's jurisdictional power itself. The
state cannot grant its courts powers that it itself does not already have.
Because, under the sovereignty paradigm., the definition of the state
and its corresponding powers to exercise jurisdiction com.e from. international law, under this paradigm. these jurisdictional powers cannot
be interpreted to provide that the state itself has the power to define
their scope.
The state's attem.pt to give dom.estic precedence to its own jurisdictionallaw over international jurisdictional law is, therefore, fundam.entally different from. its atrernpr to give precedence to its own substantive law over substantive international law. By directing its courts
through the vehicle of dornestic law to disregard international law, the
state is usually m.aking no claim. to exercise authority within the
international realm.. Consistent with its sovereign powers, it is only
directing its courts as to whether to apply international law. Here,
however, by attem.pting to prescribe jurisdiction itself, the state is no
longer able to subordinate international law to dom.estic law within
the confines of the internationally defined walls of sovereignty. Rather,
by attem.pting to define these very walls, they disappear, and the state
is left attem.pting to legislate within the international realm..
Norm.ally, for exam.ple, United States courts could, under the paradigm., defer to an act of Congress or an executive order directing the
United States arrned forces to seize sm.all erierny coastal fishing boats
in t irne of war, a violation of international law. 141 Such a decision
would not m.ean that the United States was usurping the role of
international law in attem.pting to unilaterally define the law of war
or the law of the sea. Operating within the internationally defined
dom.estic order, the United States courts sim.ply would be giving
deference to dornestic over international law. When atrernpting to
define the jurisdictional contours of the state itself, however, the state
can no longer be said to be exercising authority within its dom.estic
realm.. Instead, the state would actually be attem.pting to prescribe
international law within the international realm.. Consistent with the
sovereignty paradigm., therefore, the state has the power (though under
international law, not the right) to violate substantive international
law. The one power it does not have is the power to define its own
powers.
Here again, if doctrine-m.akers are to create doctrine that reinforces
rather than weakens the underlying social order reflected by the sov-

141. See cases cited supra note 133.
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ereignty paradigm., they m.ust create doctrine that recognizes jurisdiction as an exception to dualism. and gives deference to the international
law of jurisdiction over dom.estic jurisdictional law, even if that law
purports to apply to cases involving foreign litigants. 14 2
III. THE NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

A. The Case for Applying the International Law ofJurisdiction
I explained in Part II, the positivist analysis, that law is a hum.an
invention to help order social behavior, and that to accom.plish this,
when it is not being em.ployed to create new or reformed social
institutions, its doctrines m.ust reinforce existing social institutions. I
further explained that the doctrine that provides that states apply their
own law of jurisdiction to cases involving foreign plaintiffs or defendants is inconsistent with the sovereignty paradigm., which is accepted
as defining the present international institutional structure. Here, in
the norrnarive section, we are no longer analytically bound to support
global institutions as they currently exist. Our only question now is
whether it is preferable in cases where there is foreign party involvernerit for states to apply the international law of jurisdiction in place
of their own self-prescribed jurisdictional law.
In the rnost general sense, a well functioning international jurisdictional system. should facilitate the effective functioning of the international judicial system. as a whole. Specifically, it should prornote an
effective system. of dispute resolution whereby opportunities for forum.
shopping will be m.inim.ized, foreign judgm.ents will be satisfied, and
jurisdictional conflicts will be avoided. In addition, because the forum.
asserting jurisdiction over a case presently dererrnines which state's
substantive law applies, the international jurisdictional system. should
also prom.ote a coherent schem.e for applying what are presently diverse
and som.etim.es conflicting national legislative policies. Finally, the
system. should ensure that all defendants, regardless of nationality, are
protected from. the inconvenience that would result from. overly broad
142. The U.S. Constitution does not purport to apply to cases involving foreign litigants. The
Constitution's framers, operating under the sovereignty paradigm, never presumed to self-define
the United States' fundamental international powers. This is reflected in the fact that the
docwnent is contextually limited to establishing the internal mechanisms of u.S. governance (i.e.,
separation of internal powers, state-federal relations, etc.).
The Constitution's contextually implicit acceptance of the sovereignty paradigm was made
explicit in the Declaration of Independence.
[These Free and Independent States] have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract
Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent
States may 0/ right do.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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assertions of jurisdiction by individual states. The current sysrern In
which all states unilaterally circurnscr.ibe their own adjudicative jurisdictional laws is not well suited to accornplish'ing any of these objectives. 14 3
143. These types of concerns have been obscured within the U.S. domestic jurisdictional
system by the contacts era emphasis on "fairness" to the defendant. They are, however, generally
referred to as relevant to the jurisdictional determination in W"orld-W"ide Volkswagon Corp. v.
W"oodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). They are articulated as follows:
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute . . . ; the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that interest is not adequately
protected by the plaintiff's power to chose the forum . . . ; the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies . . . .
Id. at 292 (citations omitted). That these concerns are relevant to jurisdictional law has been
repeated in several subsequent cases by the Court. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct.
of Ca., Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 104-05 (1987).
Exactly how these types of concerns fit into the minimum contacts analysis has been the subject
of a great deal of confusion. The Supreme Court has interpreted International Shoe's statement that
the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with a forum "such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," as establishing two
separate tests: a minimum contacts test and a fair play and substantial justice test. For example,
the court in World-Wide Volkswagen states:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying
its law to the controversy; even if the forum state is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of federalism may sometimes act
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
444 U.S. at 294. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 ("However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has
had the 'minimum contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him."). The minimum contacts test in these cases maintains the exclusively defendant-centric
concern with protecting individuals from jurisdictional overreach by forums with whom they have
constitutionally insufficient contacts. The fair play and substantial justice test or fairness test as
it has come to be called provides for balancing the other relevant concerns with the interests of
the defendant.
The Court, because of lack of internal consensus, has been unable to state definitively the
relationship between these two tests. There is language in some cases suggesting that the
Constitution requires that the defendant's requisite contacts with the forum under the minimum
contacts test must first be independently established without regard to various other interests.
Only then does the Constitution allow or, for some, require that the other interests defined in
World-Wide Volkswagen be taken into account. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (opinion announced
by O'Connor ].) ("W"hen minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the
plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed
on the alien defendant. "). Other cases have suggested that the considerations of the fairness prong,
"sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required." E.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985); Asahi, 480 U.s. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional."). These pronouncements have led some
lower courts to conclude that the constitutional test determining personal jurisdiction in the
United States has actually collapsed into one large balancing test of the competing jurisdictional
interests. E.g., Sybaritic, Inc. v. Iriterporr Inr'L, Inc., 957 F.2d 522,524 (8th Cir, 1992); Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981). Finally some courts
seem to reject the broader consideration of the fairness prong altogether. See, e.g.; companion cases,
Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984), and Calder v. Jones 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984).
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The present tnultiplicity of nationally defined and overlapping jurisdictional forurns allows plaintiffs to shop for the forurn that will
apply the rnost pro-plaintiff substantive law. To the extent that nations
do not apply uriiforrn choice of law rules, the ourcorne of cases in the
present sysrern very often depends on the idiosyncratic jurisdictional
rules of individual forurns.v''" Thus, parties in their dealings with
foreigners are unable to know with certainty what laws will be applied
to their transactions in the event of litigation. This is inconsistent with
an effectively functioning dispute resolution sysrern. In addition to
uriderrnining the legal predictability necessary for social and cornrnercial actors to plan future international activities, a sysrern that fails to
give parties advance notice of the laws with which they m.ust cornply
is also unfair. Furtherrnore, the present systern, in which each state's
uncoordinated jurisdictional laws can be rnanipulated to dererrnine
applicable substantive law, i mpedes the development of a globally
coherent or even consistent approach to coordinating the application
of diverse national legal regirnes. An organized sysrern of international
jurisdictional rules, while unlikely to cornp lerely elim.inate the potential for forurn shopping, would provide that it only occur to the extent
that it is not inconsistent with the intended functioning of an ordered
international jurisdictional systetn. 14 5
In addition to creating opportunities for plaintiffs to take advantage
of incongruities, the present system. of nationally self-prescribed jurisdictional law also clearly i mpairs the effective functioning of the
international dispute resolution system by actually underrnirring the
likelihood that countries will cooperate with each other in satisfying
For a helpful explanation of the development of the two step analysis, see Gregory Gelfand, A
Dissenting View of Asahi Metal Industry Co., LTD v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 873, 886-91
(1988).
144. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping} Domestic and International, 63 TuL. L.
REV. 553 (1989) (explaining that international forum shopping is common and is frequently
outcome determinative).
145. For example, the U.S. system allows for forum shopping. In contrast to the international
system, however, this is the intended result of a coordinated approach to jurisdiction that, if
appropriately designed, should not undermine the goals of the larger judicial system. The
outcomes of cases in the United States are, in fact, not significantly affected by the fact that
plaintiffs often have the ability to choose between internal forums within the United States. This
is because the substantive laws in the various states, as well as the choice of law rules that
determine which forum's laws will ultimately be applied, are far more uniform than they are
internationally. Hazard states:
{T]he premise that the jurisdictional problem is a territorial one may appear to beg a central
question in the conflict of laws . . . . The homogeneity of the federal union, as distinguished
from the heterogeneity of the international community, makes choice of forum among
United States courts rather a technical, legal problem than one of major political dimensions.
Hazard, supra note 69, at 245. All of the major domestic jurisdictional systems currently allow
forum shopping in certain circumstances, but usually to a far more limited extent than in the
Uriited States. See generally Friedrich Juenger, judicial jurisdiction in the United States and in the
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH L. REV. 1195 (1984).
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foreign judgments. Under almost any jurisdictional scheme, the forum
or fora that have jurisdiction over disputes will be limited at times to
those where defendants do not have assets. In these cases, effective
judicial redress depends upon the willingness of courts to execute the
judgm.ents of foreign courts.J''" Courts will, however, typically refuse
to execute such foreign judgments if they consider the foreign court
to have exhorbitantly asserted jurisdiction in the underlying case.l"?
Because under the present system state jurisdictional parameters are
self-circwnscribed, disagreem.ents over what is appropriate result in
countries refusing to satisfy each other's judgm.ents. Far m.ore foreign
judgm.ents, therefore, would be satisfied if states accepted a generally
agreed upon international law of jurisdiction as domestically applicable. 14 8
An even more egregious breakdown of judicial cooperation occurs
when the present system of uncoordinated, self-circum.scribed, overlapping jurisdictional forums leads to m.ore than one state com.peting for
jurisdiction over the sarne case. For parties to a dispute subject to
differing judgments, the result of such conflicts of jurisdiction is
unnecessary expense, confusion, and unfairness. Another result for states
whose courts are involved is increased diplomatic friction. These conflicts,
146. Friedrich Juenger describes the consequences that flow from the failure of states to
recognize foreign judgments:
To retry cases that have been authoritatively decided violates fundamental tenets of judicial
economy . . . . Such duplication is not only wasteful; it punishes private litigants and exacts
a toll from international commerce. To protect their interests, parties engaged in multinational transactions must either resort to arbitration or insist on advance payments or
guarantees, which increases the transaction costs of doing business abroad.
Juenger, supra note 9, at 4.
147. See Juenger, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that in preparing a general report on judgment
recognition for the Twelfth International Congress of Comparative Law, he found that of twentyone countries from four continents studied, "with the notable exception of the State of South
Australia all [the studied] legal systems . . . exercise some form of review of the rendition state's
jurisdiction").
Sometimes states will refuse to exercise foreign judgments based on exclusive claims of
jurisdiction of their own. As Michael Akehurst explains:
The French ordinance of 1629 which forbade the execution in France of foreign judgments
against French nationals was based on the idea that French courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over French nationals; a similar rule exists in France to this day. Swiss courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over personal actions against persons domiciled in the canton in question.
Hungarian courts claim exclusive jurisdiction in divorce cases if either party is a Hungarian
national. A somewhat similar rule exists in Yugoslavia, which also claims exclusive jurisdiction in succession cases over immovables in Yugoslavia and over movables left abroad by
Yugoslav nationals. In France a clause compromissoire conferring jurisdiction French courts is
regarded as ousting the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
Akehurst, supra note 9, at 238 (citations ommitted).
148. In fact, reaching agreement on jurisdictional limits has been so integral to the willingness
of states to satisfy each other's judgments that the existing bilateral or regional treaties on
satisfaction of judgments, of necessity, specify that, assuming other relevant criteria are met,
foreign judgments must be satisfied in cases where the original assertion of jurisdiction is not
inconsistent with certain defined limits. See supra note 12.
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even without a centrally coordinated jurisdictional system., are usually
averted because courts will generally stay their proceedings if another
court has already accepted jurisdict iorr.J?" Such judicial deference is
often not given, however, when a second forum. regards the first forum.
as having "extraterritorially" irnposed its substantive laws beyond its
Ieg it irnate prescriptive powers.J?"
While the underlying conflict is over the nature and extent of a
nation's right to prescribe laws rather than to adjudicate cases, such
conflicts will be ameliorated to the extent that international law generally evolves to circumscribe effectively the assurnprion of adjudicative
jurisdiction and does so specifically in cases involving prescriptively
controversial laws. 151
The present uncoordinated system. of jurisdiction can also result in
the opposite situation where no state will assert jurisdiction over a
clispure.I '? In the United States, which has a legacy of concern with

149. United States court cases on concurrent jurisdiction usually address applications for
injunctions against a party's pursuing litigation in a foreign country. See, e.g., Robin Cheryl Miller,
Annotation, Propriety of Federal Court Injunction Against Suit in Foreign Country, 78 A.L.R. FED.
831 (1983 & Supp. 1994). In accordance with principles of comity, U.S. courts generally give
deference and mutual respect for concurrent foreign proceedings, provided the foreign court is
proceeding to a separate judgment offering full justice and remedies comparable to those under
U.S. law. E.g., Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233 (1922); Federal Trade Cornrnn v.
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). CfM/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (discussing British courts
acceptance of jurisdiction over case already commenced in the United States).
150. W"hile there are many examples of such conflicts, the most notorious was perhaps the
antitrust litigation initiated by the liquidator for Laker Airways in the 1980s. Objecting to what
it regarded as the "extraterritorial" application of U.S. antitrust law, the British court in this case
issued a series of orders enjoining parties from participating in the U.S. action. Ultimately, the
conflict was resolved when the British House of Lords ruled that jurisdiction was properly
exercised in the United States. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. W"orld Airways, 559 F. Supp.
1124 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian W"orld Airlines, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Ci r, 1984). For further discussion, see generally Aryeh Friedman, Laker Airways:
The Dilemma of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Conflicting National Policies, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 181
(1985).
151. Discussing the link between adj ud icatory jurisdiction and the application of substantive
law, see Arthur von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63
B.U. L. REV. 279, 323 (1983) ("[W"]here a forum has a strong or vital interest in having its law
(or perhaps the law of a third state) apply to a matter, this interest may justify the taking of
specific jurisdiction where it would otherwise be refused."). The importance or lack of importance
of the link between the forum whose substantive law should be applied and the forum that accepts
jurisdiction in a given case has been a recurring theme in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.;
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225-26 (1977); Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). For further discussion of the relationship between
prescriptive conflicts and adjudicatory jurisdiction, see also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 280 (1982).
152. Vischer, supra note 79, at 204 ("The negative conflict can lead to a 'deni de justice' for
the claimant, if he cannot obtain jurisdiction on the grounds that no State considers its courts
competent."). Civil law countries sometimes exercise jurisdiction by necessity, "on the independent ground that no other court would be willing to exercise it." Brian Pearce, The Comity
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jurisdictional overreach dating back to the rationale behind territorial
jurisdiction, jurisdictional problem.s are viewed as em.erging when
states exceed their jurisdictional grants. Yet avoiding negative conflicts
of jurisdiction is also a requirem.ent of an effective dispute resolution
system.. States at tim.es refuse to provide judicial fora to foreign parties
to econom.ize on judicial resources and to protect defendant nationals.
A dom.estically applicable international law of jurisdiction could coordinate jurisdictional responsibilities so that som.e forum. would always
be available to hear any legitim.ate dispute.
Finally, the im.plem.entation of a system. of universally adopted international lim.itations on state jurisdiction is the only way for states
to effectively ensure that their nationals will be protected from. overly
broad assertions of jurisdiction by individual states. Currently, there is
no effective lim.it on even the m.ost extrem.e assertions of jurisdiction
by state entities. For exam.ple, a country could theoretically claim.
world-wide jurisdiction and m.ake its courts available to any plaintiff
who was willing to pay the proper fees. Other than the non-dom.estically applicable, and correspondingly underdeveloped, international
law of jurisdiction, 153 there is little to discourage such behavior. Before
dism.issing this problem. as hypothetical, recall that, under the French
Code Civile, French courts can assert jurisdiction over any case involving a French plaintiff. 1 54 Thus, if I get into a traffic accident with a
French citizen outside of m.y office in Delaware, I could be sued in
France. Likewise, Gerrnan law provides that if the defendant has any
property in Gerrnany, then German courts have unlim.ited personal
jurisdiction over that defendanr.T'> If I, therefore, happen to own a few
shares of Daim.ler-Benz stock, Germ.an courts could assert unlim.ited
personal jurisdiction over m.e.
False comfort m.ight be found in the belief that judgm.ents in such
cases would, for reasons I have explained, generally be hard to satisfy
outside the jurisdictions rendering them.. All parties to the Brussels
Convention, however, are obligated under the term.s of the Convention
to recognize and enforce each other's judgm.ents. 15 6 The Convention

Doctrine as a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U.S.-E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 525,
544 (1994). Acceptance of this doctrine has, however, been controversial in the United States. See
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colurrrbia S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408,419 n.13 (1984) (declining to
consider the express adoption of jurisdiction by necessity, as such a change would constitute a
"potentially far reaching rnodificarion of existing law"). See also Tracy Lee Troutman, Jurisdiction
by Necessity: Examining One Proposal for Unbarring the Doors of Our Courts, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 401 (1988)
153. See supra note 9 (discussing the existence of this law). See also supra note 17 (discussing
the likely content of this law).
154. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
155. 3 Gerrnan ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO}, art. 23.
156. See Brussels Convention, supra note 12, title III.
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does forbid signatory states from. solely relying on "exhorbitanr" jurisdictional bases, like those provided by French and Germ.an law, when
asserting jurisdiction over dom.iciliaries of other signatory srares.J"?
The Convention, however, actually goes so far as to discrim.inatorily
require that parties m.ust enforce judgm.ents of other signatory states
against foreign dom.iciliaries, even when the only basis for jurisdiction
is an "exhorbirant" one. 15 8 This should be of particular concern to the
United States, whose citizens are perhaps the m.ost likely target of such
d iscr im.inariorr.I??
In addition to being unfair to individuals, very broad state claim.s
of jurisdiction, particularly when applied in a discrim.inatory fashion,
have the potential to cause tensions between states. That states take
such offenses against their nationals "personally" is reflected by the fact
that international law has traditionally viewed illegitim.ate uses of
power by states with regard to nationals of foreign states as a vicarious
offense against the foreign state itself. I 6 0 In fact, early international
hum.an rights law was lim.ited to the protection of aliens on the theory
that only states, not individuals, had exclusive rights under international law. 16 I

B. Which International Law ofJurisdiction?: Custom us. Treaty
Once the desirability of a dom.estically applicable international law
of jurisdiction is accepted, the question arises, which is preferrable:
creating a new rnultilateral jurisdictional treaty, as would be provided
by a Hague Convention, or deriving the international law of jurisdic157. ld. art. 3.
158. ld. art. 4
159. One cornmentaror identified this as:
the most regressive step that has occurred in international recognition and enforcement
practice in this century. If not corrected, the example set by the Convention may well set
in motion forces that will undermine much of what theory and practice have done during
our century to create, with respect to the recognition and enforcement of judgments a decent
and workable international order.
Von Mehren, supra note 9, at 1060.
160. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 9, i ntro, to pt. VII. ("Injury by a state to the
nationals of another state implicates relations between those states, and responsibility for such
injury was established early as a norm of customary international law. The injury to the person
has been seen as an offense to the state of his nationality.").
161. ld. Pursuant to this theory, "{sjrare responsibility for injury to aliens . . . is not seen as
creating rights for the alien under international law; he or she benefits because the law sees an
offense to the individual as an offense against the state whose nationality the individual bears."
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw, CASES AND MATERIALS 595 (3d ed. 1993). The
Restatement (Third) also refers to, "{rjhe difference in history and in jurisprudential origins between
the older law of responsibility for injury to aliens and the newer law of human rights," and notes
that the dogmas that gave only states rights under international law limited the application of
standards of justice to foreign nationals. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 9, introduction to pt.
VII.
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tion from. existing custom.ary practice?162 The treaty approach should
be pursued. The process of negotiating a treaty best allows for conflicting national views on the proper scope of jurisdictional law to be
resolved and for a global consensus to be reached. In addition, while
custom. often has to be derived from. am.biguous and contradictory
exam.ples of state practice, conventions, once in place, are finely tuned
written docum.ents that precisely state the law. 163 Finally, if states
accept that the international law of jurisdiction should be applied,
whether in the form. of custom or treaty, a multilateral treaty such as
a Hague Convention would provide a clearly defined norm that could
be applied as custom.ary international law in countries that have not
acceded to the Converrcion.U'"
CONCLUSION
In Part II of this Article, the positivist analysis, I explained that, if
legal doctrine is to reinforce rather than weaken the existing international system., in accordance with the sovereignty paradigm., it m.ust
provide that the international law of adjudicative jurisdiction should
be applied by dom.estic courts in civil cases involving foreign parties.
In Part III of the Article, I provided additional norm.ative argum.ents
for why the dom.estic application of a well-developed international law
of jurisdiction best answers the institutional needs of the international
judicial system..
This Article is a call for the United States, as well as other countries
who are m.em.bers of the Hague Convention, to successfully conclude
and ratify an international jurisdictional treaty. It is also a call to courts
both in the United States and abroad to begin to apply the international law of jurisdiction in whatever form. it develops.
One of the great challenges currently facing specialists in international law is to define structures that will effectively coordinate the
allocation of international regulatory authority. Hopefully, this Article
has met this challenge in the area of adjudicatory jurisdiction. The
international conununity in this and other areas m.ust sum.m.on the
political will to im.plem.ent such structures. Failure to do so, given the
trem.endous increase in transnational econom.ic and social interaction
that has accom.panied the rise of the global econom.y, will cause ever
162. See supra note 15 (explaining that custom and treaty are the two primary sources of
international law). See supra note 13 (discussing plans for a possible Hague Convention).
163. For further discussion of the advantages of treaty law over custom, see generally]. Patrick
Kelly, Legitimizing International Law: Customary International Law Reconsidered, (forthcoming
1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (arguing that custom should be eliminated as a source of international law.)
164. For a reference to countries applying various of the Hague conventions as customary
international law, see supra note 10.
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increasing regulatory confusion, econom.ic inefficiency, and political
conflict.

